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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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6 December 1985

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

CONTENTS

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

Mid-November Soviet Comment on U.S. Plans for Continuing SDI (Various sources, various dates)	1
PRAVDA's Korionov Comment Soviet Journal on ASAT, by Vladimir Kazakov Gen Shabanov's Objections, by V.M. Shabanov Lebedev Examines Possible Effectiveness TASS Report 'Cardinal Issue' at Talks Reagan Reaffirms Importance Double Standards Used	11 12 14 14
Idea That SDI Can Help Prevent War Rebutted (A. Kudinov; Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 3 Oct 85)	16
Soviet Naval Journal on SDI Navigational Components (V. Shinkov, et al.; Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 7, Jul 85).	20
West European Union on Coordinated Response to SDI (Vinceno Nigro; Rome LA REPUBBLICA, 15 Nov 85)	27
Hanover Conference Results in Eureka Analyzed by IZVESTIYA (Moscow IZVESTIYA, 9 Nov 85)	29
Sweden Plans Eureka Projects, Comments on Hanover Meeting (Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER, various dates)	31
Government Wants to Participate, by Mats Holmberg Two Projects Suggested, by Mats Holmberg Editorial Views Meeting	31 32 33
Swedish Firms ASEA, Volvo, Ericsson Interested in Eureka (Hans Henrik Ronnow; Stockholm NY TEKNIK, 25 Jul 85)	35
USSR's Space Research Institute Director Interviewed on Tokyo TV (Ronald Zinnurovich Sagdeyev Interview; Tokyo NHK Television Network, 18 Nov 85)	37

(Eugene Forson; Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC, 30 Oct 85)	38
Briefs Moscow Cites U.S. Magazine Moscow TV Cites U.S. Senators	39 39
U.SUSSR GENEVA TALKS	
French LE MONDE on U.S., USSR Summit Preparations (Editorial; Paris LE MONDE, 6 Nov 85)	40
Brazil: Geneva Yields Only Agreement To Continue Dialogue (Sao Paulo Radio Bandeirantes, 21 Nov 85)	41
SALT/START ISSUES	
USSR's Semeyko Refutes Alleged Arms Violations (Lev Semeyko; Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland, 8 Nov 85)	42
Finnish Paper Assesses Gorbachev Strategic Arms Proposal (Editorial; Helsinki UUSI SUOMI, 5 Oct 85)	44
Finnish Paper: USSR Perhaps Allowing Nuclear Arms Inspection (Editorial; Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 8 Oct 85)	46
Briefs Standing Consultative Commission Session Ends	47
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES	
Dutch Businessman on Cruise Issue, USSR Contacts (Ernst van Eeghen Interview; Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT, 2 Nov 85)	48
EUROPEAN CONFERENCES	
Newspapers React to Reagan's UN Speech Proposals (Various sources, 25, 26 Oct 85)	53
Inaugurates 'New Diplomacy' 'Global Approach' Lauded, Editorial 'Clever Answer' to Soviet Proposal, Editorial	53 54 55
Briefs USSR CDE Delegate on Non-Use of Force	56
NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS	
Finnish Prime Minister Backs Nuclear Free Zones (Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 19 Oct 85)	57
Dublin Committee of Unionists Urges Nordic Nuclear Free Zone (Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 21 Oct 85)	58

MID-NOVEMBER SOVIET COMMENT ON U.S. PLANS FOR CONTINUING SDI

PRAVDA's Korionov Comment

PM141316 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Nov 85 First Edition p 4

[Vitaliy Korionov article: "Imperial Ambition; The 'Star Wars' Program in the U.S. Administration's Global Plans"]

[Text] Today there is no other problem more important for the peoples on the planet than the preservation of peace and the prevention of nuclear catastrophe. And the more persistently mankind seeks an answer to the question concerning the origins of the immediate threat, so much the greater is the alarm with which it focuses its vision on the sword being raised above it by th U.S. militarists.

These sinister schemes have materialized in a most concentrated fashion in the "star wars" program, which the U. S. Administration is trying to package in the gaudy wrappings of "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI). These efforts have become particularly persistent on the eve of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva, with which the peoples are linking their hopes for positive changes in international relations.

To achieve specific and tangible agreements in Geneva, which would help to strengthen security and confidence in the world and would offer an opportunity to half the process of the accumulation and improvement of mass destruction weapons — this is the Soviet Union's sincere desire. It has been embodied in the new package of large-scale peace proposals put forward by M.S. Gorbachev during his visit to France.

Certain U.S. circles have a different approach toward the meeting. Incantations can be heard coming from Washington round the clock: The "Strategic Defense Initiative" must not be discussed in Geneva, even if this would rule out any chances of reaching agreement on the limitation of offensive weapons. "There can be no question at all of abandoning it at any time," Pentagon chief C. Weinberger claims in connection with the "star wars" program.

The "star wars" program embodies the long-cherished hegemonistic schemes of the most bellicose circles of U.S. imperialism. In our time, when the peoples' desire for freedom and national independence has become insuperable, the newly emerged pretenders to world domination see no other way but violence intheir attempts to attain their mild goals. The reliance on violence also underlies the "star wars" program. Back in 1946 [date as published] the Rand Corporation, one of the U.S. ruling clique's "think tanks," declared: "The state which will be the first to score important successes in space will be recognized as world leader in the military and scientific spheres."

U.S. imperialism's plans to break the military-strategic parity existing between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO are failing one after the other. Therefore, Washington is now reaching for outer space in the hope of attaining military superiority over socialism there and establishing its control over the planet.

"Our objective," the White House chief tried to make out a few days ago, "is to ensure greater security in the world on the basis of creating a reliable non-nuclear shield which will defend people by preventing weapons from reaching their set targets..." but those who are building this "shield" have something else to say. "For us outer space is primarily a theater of military operations," commander of the USAF Space command, admits.

The air-space doctrine adopted in the United States last year claims that the U.S. Air Force, which will include the strike space means, bears the basic responsibility for ensuring superiority in outer space and that this superiority "ensures for the United States the freedom of action to deliver effective strategic strikes and offers unlimited opportunities for military actions." And the regulations of the very same Air Force read: "...the growing importance of space operations leads to the possibility of space-to-space or space-to-earth military actions." So, what kind of "defense" can we speak about after all this?

The big talk about the pure research nature of the program, hypocritically styled "Strategic Defense Initiative," is aimed at simpletons. Its purpose is to cover up the creation [sozdaniye] of strike space weapons. Who would be naive enough to believe that the bosses of military concerns would halt halfway when they are promised exorbitant profits and the research itself is conducted under Pentagon orders and contracts? And is there any soberminded person who would believe that the purpose of the intended space weapons is to lead to the liquidation of nuclear weapons? Here is a cynical admission by E. Teller, "father of the hydrogen bomb": "The fairy tale that SDI is meant to further the liquidation of nuclear weapons on earth was invented for domestic consumption in the United States and in order to deal a blow to the antiwar movement and make it accept SDI."

It is not only the Americans, but also the West Europeans, Japanese, and other "partners" who are being deceived. There is speculation upon the peoples' natural desire for security and upon people's centuries-old ideas that defense is a boon and that it is possible to take cover behind a "shield." In fact, the claim that the U.S. space "shield" could allegedly ensure security not only for the United States but also for its allies is just another swindle.

In the nuclear age, more than ever before, security can be only common and collective. Peaceful coexistence, detente, disarmament, buildup of confidence, and development of international cooperation -- this is the true path to ensure the security of all peoples and states.

Common sense leads additional millions of people to the conclusion that the "star wars" program will thwart all the efforts aimed at terminating the arms race and will result in an even more dangerous nuclear confrontation.

The entire experience of NATO's existence testifies that Washington has invariably used the tension it has itself created to deploy hundreds of its military bases in West Europe, just as in Asia and other parts of the world, to station its troops on other peoples' territory, and to turn these countries and entire regions into testing grounds for its nuclear, missile, chemical, and other deadly weapons. It is, after all, perfectly clear that the U.S. allies in NATO and other military blocs are in no position to exert the slightest real influence on the scale or pace of the "star wars" program's implementation. And it is primarily up to them to "get themselves out of the mess" being cooked up by the transatlantic "chef."

Meanwhile, this program has gained its supporters in Bonn and Tokyo. And this must put on their guard those who truly hold precious the cause of security in Europe and Asia. It is no accident that the role of SDI advocates outside the United States has been taken up by those FRG and Japanese circles which are calculating that by participating in this program they will gain an opportunity to circumvent the ban on the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Is this the path leading to security in Europe and Asia?

The transatlantic "sirens" are striving to assure the states being involved in the "star wars" program's implementation that their participation in it will help ensure these countries' sovereignty. Here, too, everything is turned upside down.

The West European countries are being assigned the role of secondary "subcontractors" in this program. Here is just one example: Britain's Defense Secretary Heseltine recently announced that agreement had been reached with the United States regarding British participation in the "star wars" program. The conditions appear to be extremely peculiar. Heseltine admitted that Weinberger did not give any guarantees regarding London's main demand that Britain's participation would assure it of orders totaling \$1.5 billion. The minister also passed over in silence another request by British firms for guarantees that they will not be refused access to U.S. technological secrets. Former FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt did have grounds for warning: "Any possible U.S. Administration in the nineties and later will conceal its technological cards and will not deal them to the Europeans out of goodwill."

A similar admission was to be seen a few days ago in the Japanese newspaper SANKET SHIMBUN. Noting what lies in store for the countries planning to step into the trap being set by Washington, it drew the conclusion: The United States "will suck them dry of all technology, and will not share its own technology for anything." Press reports have made it known that the United States is insisting on receiving from Japan the military technology necessary for the production of space strike weapons. This concerns in particular antisatellite weapon guidance systems [sistemy navedeniya], development [razrabotka] of laser weapons, robotics, and so on.

As regards the "security" which is supposedly promised by Japan's participation in Washington's latest militarist scheme, it is sufficient to recall a few statements by official U.S. Administration spokesmen in order to obtain a clearer picture in this respect. R. Armitage, U.S. assistant secretary of defense, declared: "The U.S. border now runs more than 5,000 miles west of San Francisco's Golden Gate." His chief's global empire appetites stretch even further. The objective of U.S. policy as applied to the Asia and Pacific region, Weinberger says openly, is to counter

[protivoborstvo] the Soviet Union "from the Persian Gulf to the Aleutian Islands." This is a pursuit of the very same policy — to turn the countries and regions being involved in the U.S. military orbit into the U.S. military's testing grounds, with all the consequences resulting from this, even in peacetime. There is no need to explain that participation in the "star wars" program would only harness these countries even more firmly to the Pentagon's chariot.

It is, therefore, no wonder that the countries, one after another, are answering Washington's invitation to get involved in this adventure with a brief but expressive "No, thank you." This is what France, Denmark, Greece, Australia, and Canada have already done. Others are hesitating.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to deceive the peoples. The fourth national conference of the U.S. Peace Council, held recently in New Haven (Connecticut), rightly noted: "Success at the Geneva meeting depends totally and fully on the U.S. Administration's readiness to abandon its 'star wars' plans."

The CPSU and the Soviet state are countering the U.S. adventurist and imperial policy with a clear and constructive course leading to a positive turnabout in the development of international relations, to the termination of the arms race on earth and its prevention in space. Those circles in Washington, which suppose that a policy of blackmail and threats toward the USSR Can be successfully pursued, are building castles in the sand. The USSR will ensure its own security and the security of its allies in any event.

The Soviet Union believes that the problem of blocking the militarization of outer space demands an approach in line with the requirements of our time. Yesterday's measures are inapplicable here. What is required today, more than ever before, is a far-signted policy based on understanding of realities and consideration of the enormous dangers which will inevitably emerge if those who bear the responsibility for making the only correct decision today were to duck this responsibility.

Soviet Journal on ASAT

PM131445 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 45, Nov 85 p 27

[Untitled article by Vladimir Kazakov, "writer on world affairs," under the rubric "Taking Up a Point"; first paragraph is reader's letter]

[Text] "As far as I know, the U.S.S.R. has already developed an anti-satellite system. And now when the U.S. is testing its ASAT weapon, Moscow frightens the West with 'star wars' in order to prevent Washington from giving effect to its plans. Does this not mean that the Soviet Union is trying to achieve military superiority? -- Joe Clapton, Washington, U.S.A.

Let me begin by saying that the Soviet Union has never sought to gain superiority over other countries, and that it has never set the pace in the arms race. As is well-known, it has simply been compelled to take countermeasures. Moreover, it should be noted that Washington has accompanied each of its attempts to gain preponderance with a propaganda campaign designed to make it appear to lag behind the U.S.S.R. In the fifties it was the alleged bomber lag and in the sixtles the missile lag. Meanwhile the Pentagon stepped up the development of these particular types of weapons, setting off spiral after spiral in the arms race. The stratagem is plain to see. Thus, when the U.S. claims that it is lagging behind in anti-satellite weapons one can be sure that development of these systems is being accelerated there.

The "Soviet threat from outer space" bogey began to be used as far back as March 1977 to frighten the Americans and thereby prepare them for the launching of large-scale space armament programmes. The then U.S. President Carter accused the U.S.S.R. of developing anti-satellite systems and trying to paralyze U.S. early warning satellites by means of laser beams. Later Pentagon spokesmen admitted that they had taken welding work on pipelines in the U.S.S.R. for laser flashes. Another indicative instance of this kind of timing occurred in 1978 when the Carter administration earmarked appropriations for the development of a new generation of anti-satellite weapons to be based on F-15 fighters.

You surely will admit that you would not have written the present letter had you not been persuaded of the superiority of the U.S.S.R. in anti-satellite weapons. But you have been deceived. Take the following facts. Washington embarked on the SAINT satellite interception programme in the late fifties, soon after the U.S.S.R orbited the first sputniks. The U.S. tested the first generation ASAT system in 1959. This program was discontinued in 1962, when it was replaced with anti-satellite systems based on the Thor and Nike-Zeus nuclear missiles. These systems were deployed on Johnston Island in the Pacific.

The Soviet Union had to take counteraction. It began testing its own antisatellite weapons. But this happened considerably later, and in 1983 these tests were discontinued and have not been resumed since. The U.S.S.R. has announced its readiness for the radical solution of the problem through agreement on the renunciation of all tests of such systems, the prohibition of new systems and the abolition of the existing ones. Our country undertook a unilateral commitment not to orbit antisatellite weapons of any kind so long as other countries refrained from doing so. The problem could have been removed from the agenda had Washington not begun to develop at an accelerated pace new generations of anti-satellite systems -- both "kinetic" (missiles and shells) and laser beam devices. Paradoxically enough, this move is now being served up as a "countermeasure."

What is being developed and tested in the U.S. is a fundamentally new class of "star wars" strike systems, and to this new threat the Soviet Union will be compelled, as hitherto, to reply. What will this lead to? To the new round in the arms race Moscow warned against in advance. But, despite the terrible consequences with which it is fraught, work on the ASAT programme was stepped up after the Reagan administration took over. The new-generation ASAT, equipped with a miniature self-homing device, is a two-stage missile carried by the F-15 fighter. Forty testing ground trials have shown that any plane of this type can be converted into an ASAT carrier and can be used in various operational conditions to destroy targets in low orbit. To start with, it is proposed to station two squadrons of ASAT-carrying F-15's on the East and West coasts of the United States. The system was fired into outer space twice last year, and on September 13 this year the first IN-FLIGHT [uppercase words printed in boldface] test using an actual target was carried out. The satellite Solwind was destroyed at an altitude of more than 450 kilometres.

You will probably recall that last year U.S. legislators withheld funds for ASAT tests pending assurances from Reagan that the U.S. wants to conclude an arms control agreement with the U.S.S.R. setting strict limitations on anti-satellite systems. Yet it is precisely the White House that refuses to enter into any such agreement.

Many Congressmen have already awakened to the facts. At a Washington press conference, Representative George Brown of California said that President Reagan holds that an agreement on anti-satellite weapons would not accord with the national interests of the United States. Why? The point is that beyond ASAT there are still more farreaching, though perhaps at first glance less obvious, plans. The ASAT project is part of the global "star wars" military-political doctrine. It should be stressed that the technical components of anti-satellite and the anti-missile space strike systems envisaged in the SDI programme are very similar. Once the most important ASAT components have been developed and tested, "kinetic" anti-missile weapons too can be deployed without any additional testing. This is why the military and, of course, the White House evinced such keen interest in the in-flight testing of ASAT. So far, the U.S. does not venture to embark on actual testing of SDI weaponry, inasmuch as it is still bound by commitments under the ABM Treaty of 1972. Because of this it was decided simultaneously to acquire an anti-satellite weapon and to develop anti-missile weapons in the guise of ASAT tests. Who, then, is seeking superiority?

The target test of a space strike weapon conducted on Friday, September 13, was another U.S. "first step" in the arms race. I am not superstituous, but I do hope that this day will not become a "black Friday" for all humanity.

Gen Shabanov's Objections

PM131624 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Nov 85 First Edition p 3

["Answers by USSR Deputy Defense Minister Army General V.M. Shabanov to questions from a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent" carried under the headline: "Preventing the Militarization of Space"—date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] Question. Why is the nonmilitarization of space the key question at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva?

Answer. It is common knowledge that the question of preventing an arms race in space is the key, priority question at the Soviet-U.S. talks. It is on its successful resolution that the resolution of the problem of limiting and reducing nuclear arms also depends. This position of ours stems quite unambiguously from the objective interconnection between offensive and defensive strategic systems. This interconnection was reflected in the preamble of the most important unlimited-duration Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems, which directly points out that "effective measures to limit antiballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of the outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons."

History cogently confirms that the creation of defensive systems inevitably prompts the qualitative and quantitative improvement of offensive weapons systems.

The creation [sozdaniye] and deployment of strike arms in space would essentially lead not only to the quantitative, but also to the qualitative growth of nuclear arms and above all, strategic offensive arms. Such is the logic of nuclear confrontation.

The work in the United States on the "Strategic Defense Initiative" program has an aggressive thrust: This work is aimed at increasing the U.S. offensive potential, undermining strategic equilibrium, and acquiring for the United States the possibility of delivering a first strike in the hope that a retaliatory strike against U.S. territory can be averted.

This proposition is so self-evident that President Reagan himself was forced to mention it in his speech of 23 March 1983: "I am clearly aware that defensive systems have limits and raise a number of problems and obscurities. If they are combined with offensive systems they may be regarded as evidence of an aggressive policy."

The United States in practice "combines" efforts under the SDI program with the development [razvitiye] and build up of offensive systems. It is creating [sozdavat] first-strike weapons, five new types of strategic delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons — two types of ground-launched ICBM's, a ballistic missile deployed on submarines, and two types of heavy bombers — and is also deploying long-range cruise missiles and other nuclear weapons systems capable of reaching the territory of the USSR and the other socialist community countries.

The work in the United States to create [sozdaniye] directed-energy space weapons, electromagnetic guns, and other weapons that are called exotic weapons in the United States primarily pursues by no means defensive aims. It is work to create [sozdaniye] new types of strike weapons of the "space-to-space," "space-to-ground," "space-to-sea," and "space-to-air" classes.

What is left for the Soviet Union to do in these conditions? It has one way out. It will be forced to ensure the restoration of the strategic balance by improving and developing [razvitiye] its own strategic forces, and by taking other necessary measures.

That is why any attempts to limit strategic offensive arms under conditions of the militarization of space become futile. If there is no ban on space strike arms, an uncontrolled arms race in all spheres will begin.

Question. The United States claims the Soviet Union is also carrying out work in the sphere of improving the ABM system, including work to create [sozdaniye] space elements of the system. What can you say about this?

Answer. 'The United States and the Soviet Union currently each have one limited ABM system (the USSR's is in the area of the capital, the United States' is in the area of the Grand Forks ICBM base).

The Soviet ABM system is strictly in line with the ABM Treaty, which permits the modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components (Article VII), while, of course, complying with the other provisions of the treaty.

As for the allegations that the USSR is carrying out work on the creation [sozdaniye] of ABM space elements, they are totally groundless. The Soviet Union does not engage in the development [razrabotka] nor, consequently, the testing of any models of space strike weapons, icluding for space-based ABM defense. Washington wants to present the matter as though the USSR, was also implementing a similar program to the U.S. SDI program. And since this is so, they say, the Soviet Union must resign itself to what the United States is doing in this sphere.

The USSR is carrying out fundamental research work in the sphere of space, work on the creation (sozdaniye) and improvement of space early-warning, reconnaissance, communications, navigation, and meteorological systems. However, this work has no bearing on the creation [sozdaniye] of space strike weapons or space ABM defense. We have no "star wars" plans analogous to the U.S. ones.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly declared that the so-called "accusations" being made by the United States of nonobservance of the ABM Treaty are farfetched and do not correspond to reality. The USSR advocates strict and rigorous observance of this treaty and considers it inadmissible to work for its erosion and question the prospect of its existence, as the United States is doing by embarking on the path of militarizing space.

Question. What can you say about the reality of creating [sozdaniye] a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements which would provide a 100 percent guarantee of a territory's cover?

Answer. The hope of creating [sozdat] an ABM system capable of intercepting 100 percent of any missiles is illusory. This is confirmed by the history of armed struggle and the dialectics of the development of means of attack and defense; the conclusions of many authoritative scientists and military specialists attest to this. The hitting of a lone ballistic missile and even of its warhead compartment [boyevoy blok], as done in the United States, does not creat real preconditions for resolving the task of repulsing a massed missile strike. Absolute weapons do not exist. It is hopeless to seek to enhance security by creating new technologies and new types of weapons. The limitation and reduction of nuclear arsenals is the way to security, and it is a political task. What is needed to resolve it is, above all, the will and the desire of state leaders.

Representatives of the U.S. Administration frequently reproach "nonbelievers" in the possibility of space ABM defense. Here they cite the example of astronauts' landing on the moon, a possibility which had also not been believed. At the same time, however, the defenders of "star wars" forget that there was no opposition on the moon. The U.S. press has cited the example that a dozen hostile inhabitant of the moon with axes could have turned that feat into a catastrophe.

The creation [sozdaniye] of a wide-scale ABM system by one side will inevitably give rise to retaliatory measures by the other side. Because, as has already been said, a global ABM defense pursues an aggressive goal — ensuring impunity for the delivery of a first nuclear strike. The other side would be obliged to use the same "new technologies" to improve its missiles to make them capable of penetrating the "space shield" in a retaliatory strike.

The aim of SDI is illusory, but its dangers are real. The result of the creation of a space-based ABM defense would be not the enhancement of security and the abolition of nuclear weapons, but on the contrary, the destabilization of the strategic situation and an uncontrolled offensive and defensive arms race.

Question. Where do you see the danger of creating antisatellite systems?

Answer. U.S. specialists admit that antisatellite systems are designed to play the part of one of the main elements in a first-strike potential. The Pentagon is seeking to obtain the opportunity to deliver a strike against Soviet satellites performing important tasks of warning of a nuclear missile attack, monitoring, communications, and navigation. The aim of this strike is to "blind" the other side, to take it by surprise and weaken its potential for retaliation in the event of nuclear aggression. F. Ikle, U.S. under secretary of defense, has frankly stated: "The use of antisatellite systems as an element of a first-strike to destroy all or many 'key' enemy satellites is designed to make a retaliatory strike considerably more difficult." You can't put it more clearly than that.

The deployment of antisatellite weapons would have a destabilizing influence on the strategic situation. Any attack, even a one-on-one [yedinchnoye], on a satellite would lead to the most serious consequences. Moreover, the accidental breakdown of an artificial earth satellite through technical failure, especially in a period of intensified tension, could be misinterpreted and cause the outbreak of an acute conflict situation.

The United States assigns a large role to antisatellite weapons in its plans for preparing for "star wars." Using the fact that there is much in common between antisatellite and antimissile weapons, it is planning to test space-based ABM defense elements under the guise of antisatellite elements. The United States thus intends to circumvent the ABM Treaty of unlimited duration which bans the creation, testing, and deployment of a space-based ABM defense.

Having been the first to create [sozdat] and deploy antisatellite complexes, the United States is now pushing on with the creation of a second-generation ASAT antisatellite system. Several flight tests have already been carried out, including against a real target in space. The appearance of this system in the U.S. arsenal will make talks on the prevention of the arms race in space more difficult, will create new problems for monitoring agreements, and will complicate the military-strategic situation.

The Soviet Union is a convinced opponent of the transformation of space into a theater of war. Its proposals on preventing the arms race in outer space and ending it on earth have been highly rated by the world public. There are no weapons in space now, nor should there be.

The USSR suggests that the United States renounce its plans to militarize space and keep it peaceful forever for the benefit of all mankind. As for the Soviet Union, as M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has stated, it "will not be the first to advance into space with weapons. We will make every effort to persuade other countries and above all, the United States not to take such a fatal step, which would inevitably increase the threat of nuclear war and lend impetus to an uncontrolled arms race on all salients."

Lebedev Examines Possible Effectiveness

LD160119 Moscow World Service in English 2000 GMT 15 Nov 85

[Sergey Lebedev commentary]

[Text] What's behind the alleged defensive nature of the U.S. "star wars" project — a misconception or a deliberate calculation? That's the point taken up by Sergeye Lebedev in the following commentary:

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at the annual reception given by the city's lord mayor has claimed that the "star wars" program was not an obstacle in the way of a favorable outcome of the approaching Soviet-American summit in Geneva.

The prime minister repeated the well-known allegations of the American Administration that the program was purely defensive. One can say with confidence that when it is leaders of states that talk of a defensive nature of strike space weapons, it's hard to believe that they are misinformed. It's common knowledge that the weapons system offered within the framework of the "star wars" program is capable of destroying space satellites. This would make it possible to blind the enemy at an early state and deprive him of an opportunity to learn what action the other side has taken.

However, progress in that field will make it possible to use space weapons against targets on the ground, too. The American newspaper THE NEW YORK TIMES has said that to function normally the system must have weapons capable of destroying ballistic missiles shortly after launching, while they are still in the atmosphere. The author of the articles notes that it would be easy to increase the range of such weapons to hit targets on the ground. At least two of the weapons system in question must be capable of reaching targets on earth from space.

How effective will the new space weapons be when used against the earth? John (Raysa), a laser expert and advocate of that type of weapons, has noted that the new system deployed in space is capable of throwing back an industrialized nation to the level of the 18th century. This refutes the claim that the new types of weapons being developed in the United States are designed to destroy the military and strategic facilities of the enemy. A space weapons system can be used for instant strikes from space against relatively unprotected targets: aircraft (?hangars), electric power stations, fields sown to grain, which will cause fires and hit civilians in the first place — thus, the picture of what the 20th century's biggest disaster might look like. That's the threat posed by a weapon which can be called defensive only for propaganda purposes.

President Reagan himself in his speech of 23 March 1983, when he announced his program, acknowledged that what he described as a defensive system could give rise to fears of a possible attack. He remarked that in combination with offensive weapons it could be seen as a factor contributing to an aggressive policy. On the other hand, the advocates of the "star wars" have obviously overestimated the defensive potential of the American initiative. A leading British expert on space research has said SDI is a threat to common sense and the very life on the globe. Dr (Baker), who has worked for many projects for the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration, including the Apollo and Shuttle programs, told a conference in Glasgow that few physicists believe that the "star wars" program would reach its objective and protect the United States and Western Europe from nuclear weapons in the event of an attack. Dr (Baker) said it was more likely that the program would be a partial success, which would increase the risk of nuclear war.

So a system which can be used to attack and at the same time provides poor protection will nevertheless become a destabilizing factor. Mikhail Gorbachev, as he talked with a delegation of the Nobel Prize winners' congress, said that if the arms race branched out into space, any strategic stability would be out of the question. Just imagine, he went on to say, what the world will look like in 10 or 20 years. Everywhere from the boundaries of the atmosphere to the heights of hundreds of kilometers, from geostationary orbits, various types of strike weapons will be flying over the people populating our planet. That is the reason why the issue of the prevention of arms race in outer space is the key issue at the Soviet-American disarmament talks.

TASS Report

LD140213 Moscow TASS in English 0815 GMT 13 Nov 85

[Text] San Francisco, November 13 TASS -- TASS correspondent Yu. Ustimenko reports:

The United States is going ahead with the development of advanced weapons under its "star wars" program. The LOS ANGELES TIMES reports that another nuclear explosion under a program to test laser weapons is planned at the nuclear test site in Nevada in December. The Pentagon strategists intend these weapons to become a major component of the so-called "space shield." The test, codenamed "Goldstone," will follow the "Cottage" blast carried out at the same site last March.

The testing is supervised by the Lawrence Laboratory in Livermore, California, one of the U.S. largest research centres concerned with the development of nuclear weapons of new types. The laser weapons development program pursued by the Livermore Laboratory, the newspaper says, is being speedily expanded and generously financed by the energy department.

Recently the laboratory received 60 million dollars in additional appropriations for the development of laser weapons, while Washington's total spending on the fulfilment of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" will exceed 26 billion dollars within the next five years alone.

Huge funds have already been set aside from these planned appropriations for the Pentagon's leading contractors. The California Lockheed Corporation alone, according to its spokesman, has secured a Pentagon contract, worth hundreds of millions of dollars, to develop ground-based missiles for hitting space targets. The corporation's spokesman also admitted that Lockheed viewed the "star wars" program as a very promising prospect for its financial prosperity.

Reagan's "star wars" program, the weekly PEOPLE'S WORLD points out, yields fabulous profits for the U.S. military-industrial complex, the most zealous advocate of the dangerous plans for the militarization of space, which are leading to another round of the arms race and to the further aggravation of international tension.

'Cardinal Issue' at Talks

LD191619 Moscow TASS in English 1611 GMT 19 Nov 85

["One of Chief Obstacles at Geneva"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, November 19 TASS — By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

The world public is looking forward to the results of the discussion of cardinal problems at the Soviet-American summit in Geneva. The solution of these problems determine the termination of the arms race, elimination of the nuclear war threat and consolidation of universal peace.

The question of whether strike weapons will be put in outer space is particularly acute now. How this question will be solved will determine world development for many years ahead. The emergence of such weapons in near-earth space would inevitably undermine stability, open new channels for an unrestricted race of armaments, above all strategic ones.

The USSR's stance on the cardinal issue remains clear and consistent: It is necessary to shut the door leading to the weapon deployment in outer space.

The United States sticks to a different position. Officials who arrived in Geneva with the American President reiterate that Washington will go ahead with work on the "Strategic Defense Initiative." And these are not merely words, for the pace of the work is accelerating in the United States. In fiscal 1985 alone, the Pentagon placed about a thousand "star wars" programmerelated contacts with more than 260 firms and laboratories. The point at issue at present is the development of a comprehensive seven-tiered anti-missile defence system comprising, along with ground-based facilities, thousands of armed satellites.

Various types of laser weaponry are being developed and tested on a broad scale. The firm Rockwell International, fulfilling a Pentagon order, devised a high-energy laser, Sigma Tau, the firm TRW — Alpha and Miracl lasers. The Miracl laser weapons have already been field-tested. X-ray lasers powered by a nuclear explosion are being designed at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

According to THE LOS ANGELES TIMES newspaper, the programme of developing laser weapons, carried out at the laboratory, is expanding rapidly and is financed generously by the U.S. Department of Energy. A nuclear blast, a part of the testing of laser weapons, is to be set off at the Nevada proving ground in December this year. The test, code-named Goldstone, will follow the "cottage" nuclear explosion conducted in March this year.

Particle beam weapons (specifically, the White Horse device), and electromagnetic rail guns are also intended for future "star wars" contemplated by the Pentagon. The U.S. Defence Department does not overlook the area of "classical" anti-missile systems either. The firm Lockheed, for instance, won an order for developing a new generation of anti-missiles designed to be launched from ground and intercept warheads at their terminal phase.

These facts show that the machine of developing strike space armaments is gaining full speed. Moreover, cirtain circles in the United States strive to convince the public that it is necessary to continue the acceleration of its peace-endangering movement. A report on key issues of American security: Anti-Satellite Armaments and U.S. Military Policy in Outer Space, drawn up by a commission headed by Brent Scowcroft, a former presidential national security adviser, claims that the militarization of space has already been started and it is impossible to stop it. In this connection the report stresses the "need" for large-scale work on developing and putting into near-earth orbits strike space weapons which should not be subjected to any restrictions.

The developments give rise to serious concern in the United States itself. It is already clear, former U.S. chief SALT-1 negotiator Gerard Smith told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that not only the actual deployment of anti-missile systems, but even their development will influence the arms control process. The strategic defence programme has become a chief obstacle in the way of reducing offensive armaments. It threatens not only the previous, but also the future agreements and treaties.

The "star wars" programme threatens primarily the 1972 treaty limiting anti-missile defence systems. They in Washington bluntly declare: When the time of deploying a partially space-based anti-missile defence system comes, the U.S. will not allow the 1972 treaty to stand in the way.

General James Abrahamson, who is in charge of the "star wars" programme, frankly admitted at closed hearings in a Senate subcommittee that the tests of anti-missile defence components, planned for the coming years, will demand some modifictions of the treaty. The general's explanations make it clear that what the Pentagon means by the "modification" is an actual renunciation of the treaty which is of exceptional importance for the process of limiting and reducing armaments.

THE WASHINGTON POST newspaper, quoting Gen. Abrahamson, ironically recalled the assurances which highly placed American Administration officials like to give by claiming that the "Strategic Defence Initiative" will not violate ABM treaty provisions.

Insisting on the implementation of the "star wars" programme means to lose a chance of attaining greater international stability and diminishing the risk of nuclear war. Losing the chance for the benefit of "unrealizable dreams" — which the "star wars" are — would mean jeopardizing the security of peoples, including the security of the U.S. population, declare sober-minded public and political figures worldwide.

Reagan Reaffirms Importance

LD081245 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1135 GMT 8 Nov 85

[Passages within slantlines were omitted from a Moscow IZVESTIYA 9 November Morning Edition page 6 TASS report on Reagan's SDI stand "Preparing for Geneva."]

[Text] Washington, 8 Nov (TASS) -- The U.S. press reports on the preparations being undertaken in the White House for the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit. It is reported President Reagan held a meeting with specialists on U.S.-Soviet relations. They included former National Security Council officials William Hyland and Richard Edgar Pipes, the head of the capital's Wilson Center, J. Billington,// and also a member of other experts. White House deputy press secretary Larry Speakes stated that// during the closed meeting the President was given "certain recommendations" on the conduct of the meeting in Geneva.

Reagan had a meeting at the White House with representatives of military concerns and with the heads of a number of reactionary organizations. At this meeting he again came out with statements supporting the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI). // According to participants the conversation, the President expressed gratitude to those invited for their support of SDI and recommended they continue to propagandize it in the most effective way.//

As is clear from remarks by Paul Weyrich, head of the extreme right-wing organization Free Congress Foundation, who took part in the meeting, the President again demonstrated a negative attitude toward the 1972 treaty on limiting antimissile defense systems.// As P. Weyrich stated, Reagan told him that "when the time comes for the deployment" of the antimissile defense system with space-based elements, "we shall not allow the 1972 treaty to hinder this".//

Another participant in the meeting, Daniel Graham, head of the reactionary High Frontier organization told journalists: "the President assured us that the program for implementing the Strategic Defense Initiative will not be blocked by any deals with the USSR".

Double Standards Used

LD110005 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 10 Nov 85

[Vladislav Kozyakov commentary]

[Text] Just a week separates us from the Soviet-American summit in Geneva. People all over the world pin great hopes on that meeting, hopes for steps that would reduce tension and curb the arms race. How realistic are these epectations? Our commentator Validslav Kozyakov examines the prospects.

We in the Soviet Union believe that the coming summit offers good opportunities for agreement provided there's mutual good will, the due sense of responsibility and of course respect for each others' interests. This is the approach that guides preparations in Moscow. We have unilaterally imposed a moratorium on all nuclear blasts, reduced missiles in Europe and pledged not to be the first to deploy weapons in space. Our far reaching proposals include a ban on all strike space weapons and an offer to reduce radically, by half, the Soviet and American nuclear arms capable of reaching each others' territory. All these are realistic measures based on the principle of equality and equal security.

As the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, has said, this may be a unique chance for reaching mutually acceptable agreement awaited by people all over the world.

We'd like to hope, the Soviet leader said, that the American Administration will use it and take a responsible approach. But reports coming in from Washington, with the summit meeting merely days off, are still conflicting. In a Voice of America broadcast addressed to the Soviet people on Saturday, President Reagan assured them that America didn't threaten the Soviet Union and never would.

But in the same broadcast he reaffirmed his "star wars" program, which experts regard as a key element for delivering with impunity the first nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. And incidentally, as the President of the United States himself acknowledged in an interview with Soviet journalists, if anyone was creating a defense system in space in combination with offensive nuclear weapons, he would be much more tempted to risk dealing a first strike.

It would seem that officials in Washington realize the danger involved. But they use double standards. Should such weapons be first developed in the Soviet Union then, as the American Defense Secretary, Weinberger, claims, the world would be in jeopardy. But, development of strike space weapons by the United States is presented as a peaceful act. By what logic and common sense may I ask? One cannot but be alarmed by Washington's obvious desire to acquire military superiority with the help of the "star wars" program come what may. As President Reagan told Soviet journalists a few days ago, the terms of our own deployment would be the elimination of the offensive weapons. The system would not be put in place he said until the Soviet Union and the United States both eliminated their offensive weapons. This statement was promptly denied by the White House.

On Wednesday the President was telling Western journalists something quite different. He would deploy the space shield unilaterally he said, even if other nuclear powers didn't agree. A week before the meeting in Geneva the cloud hanging over it is still in evidence. Whether it will dissipate to open vistas for agreement depends on Washington. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned we are ready, said Mikhail Gorbachev, to consider the state of international relations in a broad and unbiased manner, so as to reach better understanding. We shall work in Geneva he said, for a just and constructive settlement of the most pressing problems now facing mankind.

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IDEA THAT SDI CAN HELP PREVENT WAR REBUTTED

Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 3 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by A. Kudinov, international correspondent: "Chasing the Mirage of Superiority; The Lies and the Truth About 'Star Wars'"]

[Text] Ever since the President of the United States publicly announced the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) program on 23 March 1983, official propaganda has made increasing attempts to publicize it. In the fear of a negative response from their own people and world public opinion, Ronald Reagan and his closest advisers have bent over backwards to dress it in attractive clothing. The White House has gone so far as to say that it will supposedly defend Americans against strategic missiles, make nuclear weapons powerless and obsolete and even pave the way for their elimination.

This form of deception is not new. Back in 1892, when arms magnate Alfred Nobel addressed a pacifist congress in Switzerland, he asserted: "It is possible that my dynamite plants will put an end to war more quickly than your congresses. On the day when two army corps are capable of destroying each other within a few seconds, civilized humanity will turn away in horror from the very idea of war." This prediction did not come true. Humanity subsequently lived through two world wars. And the suggestion that the new, space-based round of the arms race will deliver people from the danger of nuclear war is the most shameless and unscrupulous form of deception.

What is the SDI--or the "star wars" program, as it is being called? It will entail the development of means of intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles in flight, medium-range ballistic missiles and tactical missiles with shorter flight trajectories. It will necessitate the development and production of new types of weapons--chemical, eximer (powered by ultraviolet rays), nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers with nuclear explosions as their generator, neutral particle beam generators, super-computers and so forth. Large optical instruments are to be installed in space and on earth to reflect and focus directed beams, homing missiles and "electromagnetic guns." Pentagon officials believe that 300-500 permanent orbital combat stations will have to be deployed. The delivery of fuel to them would take more than 250 space shuttle flights.

There is also a more "modest" space system with interceptor missiles. Its proponents, Z. Brzezinski, R. Jastrow and M. Kampelman, are insisting on a "double-layer" system of space-based nuclear weapons. One "layer" will

consist of 100 highly maneuverable "space platforms" with heavy armor reinforcement, having weapon systems on board and carrying a total of 15,000 interceptor missiles. The second "layer" would consist of antimissile devices on earth.

It is significant that even the most enthusiastic proponents of the program have promised that all of this can be done within no less than several decades. At that time, as they say, currently existing missiles will be thrown off course "quite effectively."

As M. S. Gorbachev said in response to TIME magazine's questions, the Soviet Union cannot give any serious consideration to the allegations that the SDI will secure invulnerability to nuclear attack weapons and thereby lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons. This, in the opinion of Soviet experts and even many American specialists, is an impossible dream and pure fantasy. The proponents of the militarization of space are turning everything upside—down. They talk about defense while preparing to attack. They publicize the space shield while forging a space sword. They promise to eliminate nuclear weapons while increasing and improving them. They promise the world stability while striving to disrupt the military balance. They talk at length about harmless scientific research while developing a new type of strike weapon. They lie about the ability of space weapons to eliminate nuclear bombs and munitions while paving the way for an even more intense race for space and nuclear weapons.

It is noteworthy that the missiles of the time when Washington expects to realize these plans will not be the same as the "currently existing" ones. The master of the White House ignored the absolutely obvious fact that the same human brain, the same research potential and the same instruments used in the development of "defensive" weapons can also be used in the development of weapons to destroy the "star wars" system, surmount or bypass it, or even find something completely new, against which it will be helpless. In this context, the absolute weapon the nuclear maniacs are seeking cannot exist: Technical progress, science and technology cannot be stopped.

If technical equipment cannot safeguard security, it is not because it is weak, but because the problem of security is essentially a political problem, and not a technical one. There is no need to prove this by launching another colossal military program. It has already been proved. There was a time when the ordinary machine-gun was seen as a cure for war. People today can also remember how E. Teller, one of the SDI's fervent admirers, called the thermonuclear bomb an instrument of "eternal peace."

The SDI program is not a research program in the pure sense of the term. It is of a different scale. They want to spend 70 billion dollars in the next few years—an unthinkable sum! This has been pointed out even by American scientists—the authors of the work "The Lie About 'Star Wars,'" published in 1984—who support a "strong America" in principle and sometimes agree with the pseudothesis of its "leading role in the world," but also feel the need to find a way of emerging "from under the shadow of nuclear weapons." These allocations are 4.5 times as great as the cost of the "Manhattan Project"—

the nuclear weapon development program—and 2.5 times as great as the expenditures on the Apollo program, envisaging the development of space travel for an entire decade, up to and including the moon walk. Experiments are being conducted with missiles of the Minuteman type to give them the properties of antimissiles. Multiple warheads are being developed for the antimissiles, and so forth. Experiments in the interception of ballistic missiles were conducted in the United States at the beginning of June 1984. This signified a transition to the actual militarization of space. The ASAT antisatellite system was tested just recently. General Abrahamson, the SDI chief, reported that guidance and tracking systems would begin to be tested in 1987 on the space shuttle.

Therefore, both the SDI and what could be called the Pentagon's parallel actions are not aimed merely at research, but at equipping the U.S. Armed Forces with the greatest variety of space weapons. The militaristic, aggressive nature of this activity is indisputable. Washington began militarizing outer space back in the late 1950's, and it has already spent colossal sums on this—around 60 billion dollars. The open-ended 1972 ABM Treaty is being subjected to an all-out attack. Its Article V prohibits the development, testing or deployment of sea-, air-, space- or mobile land-based ABM components or systems.

Therefore, taking the risk of undermining the existing system of international agreements setting definite limits for the arms race and of undermining the very possibility of new and even more effective agreements, and ignoring, in the final analysis, the security of its own country, the American administration is energetically promoting the "star wars" program. Why?

It seems to us that it is motivated by the following considerations. First of all, as the "Defense Guide for 1984-1988," a government document, indicates, the United States is still chasing after the dangerous mirage of superiority to the Soviet Union. The document clearly implies that the United States must regain the ability to win a nuclear war. For this reason, the White House is rejecting all of the Soviet Union's peaceful proposals with regard to outer space and is urging the Pentagon to prepare for war in space. "For the United States, the development of antisatellite forces would be senseless," a certain Karras said with cynical frankness, "unless it plans to deliver a first strike and start a nuclear war." And that is that!

Secondly, the U.S. military-industrial complex' direct interest in the colossal profits the SDI could produce is playing a significant role. Military concerns are waiting for new major initiatives from the administration because the contracts for the MX missile, the B-IB bomber, the Trident II and Pershing II missiles, the cruise missiles, the Stealth bomber and the latest Midgetman missiles will run out soon. And their appetites are getting bigger. The preparations for "star wars" will give them a chance to receive contracts worth a trillion dollars. The military-industrial corporations have not seen any programs this colossal since World War II. Washington is also assuring its allies that they can have their fill of the space pie. These arguments have been supported by some in Japan, England, the FRG and Italy.

Thirdly, the neoconservatives now constituting the ruling elite realize that the extremist wave in the United States cannot be long-lived. For this reason, there have been increasingly obvious deliberate attempts to firmly establish the extreme rightwing line in White House domestic and foreign policy and to impose it on the country for many years—that is, to force Reagan's successors to start taking it into account now, regardless of who might win the next election. People in Washington want to make the new and extremely dangerous round of the arms race irreversible under the present administration.

The Soviet Union has consistently wanted space to always be an arena of productive cooperation, and not of military confrontation. The realities of life are such that an outer space free of weapons and open to all for peaceful purposes is now one of the essential conditions for lasting peace on earth. The USSR, the pioneer in the exploration of outer space, is prepared to agree to the most radical solutions for advancement along the road leading to the cessation of the arms race and the prevention of its transfer to space. American ruling circles, on the other hand, must realize that all of the moves of one side will be followed by the countermoves of the other, that poison will be followed by an antidote. By the laws of historical retribution, the weapons forged by those who want to dominate others will turn against them.

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SOVIET NAVAL JOURNAL ON SDI NAVIGATIONAL COMPONENTS

Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 7, Jul 85 pp 76-80

[Article by: Capt 1st Rank V. Shinkov, doctor of technical sciences; Capt 1st Rank V.Panteleyev, candidate of military science; V. Mikhaylov, candidate of military science; Lt. A. Baydukov, under the rubric: "In Foreign Navies": "'Star Wars' Navigation Components"]

[Text] With the launch of the world's first artificial earth satellite in October 1957, the Soviet Union began the peaceful assault on space in the name of scientific progress and for the good of all mankind. And this peaceful assault continues.

In the meantime, super-secret killer satellites and other military space system projects are being developed in the laboratories and factories of the leading U.S. military industries. The Pentagon is financing a program for the production of systems for strategic reconnaissance, for conducting military operations in space itself and for attacking surface targets from space.

The formation of the U.S. Armed Forces Joint Space Command, the President's decision to create a missile defense using space-based elements and new developments in the area of intelligence and space-based radio navigation equipment clearly show an increased tempo in "Star Wars" preparations.

The latest development directly concerning the problem of naval development requires more specific explanation.

In accordance with Navy directives, until 1964 the U.S. Navigation Satellite System "TRANSIT" was being developed for extremely precise, navigation support for nuclear missile submarines. It included three elements: navigation satellites, a ground control system and user equipment.

The "TRANSIT" satellites circle the earth in polar orbit at an altitude of about 1100 km with a period of 107 minutes. Every satellite has electronic equipment (a radio transmitter operating simultaneously on two frequencies--

^{*}According to material from the foreign press.

approximately 150 and 400 MHz, a receiver, an antenna system and specialized electronic memory). The equipment onboard power supply is provided by a system of nickel-cadmium batteries with an output of about 30 watts. On the four "wings" there are solar panels which charge the storage batteries during the illuminated portion of the orbit. Transmission from the satellites are made in 120 second cycles. The transmission power is 1-1.5 watts.

The ground control system consists of four tracking stations, two data upload stations as well as the Naval Observatory which updates the time on the satellites and synchronizes it to a common time scale.

The user equipment consists of an antenna and feeder system; a receiver; a stable oscillator; a computer; information input-output, conversion and processing devices and a power supply. It provides for determination of location coordinates and calculation of a ship's course between observations and instantaneous calculated data (azimuth and distance from a given point on the course, distance covered, coordinates, course and speed of a shift and the next time available).

The average three-dimensional coordinate deviation determined for moving objects (ships) using the "TRANSIT" Navigation Satellite System, as reported in the American press, was 90-100 meters (with a margin of error of 0.7) with one fix and for stationary objects of 20-30 meters using several fixes.

Western military specialists felt that the system precision did not meet modern requirements. Its deficiencies were: capable of use only with slow moving objects (ships and boats); calculation in only two dimensions (longitude and latitude); long time interval between observations (from 30-120 minutes); the length of time required for a fix (4-16 minutes) and the necessity to precisely know the ship's speed vector and geocentric radius.

In 1973, the U.S. Defense Department decided to develop and create the new "NAVSTAR"* navigation satellite system

It was hoped that this system would help solve the problem of land, sea, air and low orbit navigation by providing location and speed determination at any time regardless of geographic factors and meteorological conditions. The average three-dimensional deviation determined by one fix, they felt, would be: for coordinates--about 10 meters and for speed--fractions of a meter per second.

The "NAVSTAR" navigation satellite system was given preference in the national development plan over all navigation systems.

For the purpose of creating a continuous global navigation field, the U.S. Department of Defense decided to deploy by 1987 18 orbital satellites which will ensure that no fewer than 4 satellites will be visible from one point for 90% of the time. This is considered to be sufficient to determine the user location in all three dimensions.

^{*}NAVSTAR--NAVigation System Using Time And Ranging

Phase 1 of program development which lasted from December 1973 until June 1979, was intended for concept validation, selection of the proposed receiver models, evaluation of deployment cost and verification of the capability to meet the requirements of the armed services. During this period eight satellites were built: four of them were put into orbit for the purpose of prototype equipment testing. At the beginning of Phase 2 in 1980, the fifth and sixth satellites were launched (the seventh was destroyed during a missile accident). At its conclusion (May 1984), three additional replenishment satellites were launched for the purpose of having a constellation of five operating satellites to provide for preliminary operational testing. There was simultaneous testing of user equipment: sea, air and land.

After the third phase of system development which immediately followed the second, it is intended that the full number of satellites proposed by the project be put into operational orbits; the user equipment will be completed and installed, and the system will be brought to operational readiness and will begin normal operation.

The NAVSTAR system also consists of three major elements: the space, control and user equipment segments (Fig. 1).




Figure 1

A---Space Segment; B---Control Segment; C--User Equipment Segment

1--remote monitor station; 2--ground antenna for uploading information; 3--master control station.

The space segment will be composed of satellites in six orbital planes (at an altitude of 20,183 km), spaced 60° apart and at an inclination angle of 63° . In each of the six orbital planes, there will be three satellites equally spaced at 120° from each other. The selection of these orbital parameters, in the opinion of its creators, provides for a period equal to half of an astral day, that is, approximately 12 hours. The system construction characteristics given make it possible to observe each satellite from just one control station at least once a day. Thanks to this, in the opinion of the project designers, this will eliminate or reduce as much as possible the dependence of the system on stations located outside U.S. territory and increase its reliability.

The design orbit life for each satellite is 5 years. For power supply to its systems, there are two solar panels providing about 450 watts of power. Special sensors make it possible to use the panel surfaces with the greatest effect. During maximum power use and when in the earth's shadow, buffer nickel-cadmium batteries are used.

The satellites transmit continuous radio signals at frequencies of 1575.4 MHz and 1227.6 MHz using pseudo-random pulse train modulation. Two coded signals are formed using phase manipulation. One of them—the P (encrypted) signal makes it possible to make highly precise measurements in a three—dimensional coordinate system available to military users only; the other signals C/A (clear) make possible less precise navigation measurements. Each satellite's P code, which is changed at 2400 hours GMT each Saturday, prevents the unauthorized use of the system for precise determination of location and time. In addition, each satellite signal is additionally coded with the C/A code at a frequency of 1.023 MHz to make it easier to lock on the P code signals and also to make less precise measurements. The C/A code is available for all users to measure navigation parameters.

There are six stations in the ground control and monitoring segment. The main station is located at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. A monitor station and an upload station will also be located there. Three other monitor stations will be located at Andersen, Guam; Wahiawa, Hawaii, and Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska. Three backup monitoring stations are planned for Maine, the Seychelles Islands and the Panama Canal Zone.

Mobile master control stations and upload stations are to be used to improve the system survivability.

The ground control segment monitors the satellite system orbit by radio, forecasts satellite ephemeris, records this in the satellite's onboard memory, synchronizes the onboard time with the ground time, checks the satellite equipment condition and so forth.

The user equipment, inasmuch as it is intended for the use of sea-going, air, ground and space users, has deliberately been put into a separate segment; the realization of its system capabilities as a whole depends to a great degree on them.

The user equipment set consists of four main elements: antenna and feeder system, receiver, computer and input-output device (Fig. 2).




Figure 2

- (1) antenna
- (2) antenna amplifier
- (3) receiver and information processor module
- (4) onboard power system
- (5) output to support devices
- (6) control and display unit

All NAVSTAR users have been divided into seven types depending on military equipment type: A--bombers, B--fighters, C--surface ships, F--submarines, M--satellites, missiles and others. Four classes of receiving equipment have been projected with consideration of the special characteristics for each regarding precision and constructions specifications.

It has been noted that with the bringing of NAVSTAR on-line approximately 27,000 users, about 1500 of them belonging to the U.S. Navy, will be able to use it. Dozens of experimental models are already being tested. The three-dimensional location of stationary objects has been established in the experiments with a precision (one "sigma") of 8-10 meters, and moving targets of 16-22 meters. The speed of a moving user has been determined with a precision of 0.12-0.8 meters per second. Overall, according to foreign press information, system tests show its relatively high capabilities.

Great attention has been given in the U.S. to the use of satellite equipment for correcting the "TRIDENT" submarine launched ballistic missile trajectory correction. It has already been proposed that signals from the NTS-2 experimental satellites be used during the test to set the "TRIDENT" ballistic missile trajectories. In this case the solution of the navigation problem in the first phase of NAVSTAR system development was done on the ground using information transmitted in the telemetry channel.

The American militarists together with their allies, while attempting to achieve superiority over the socialist countries in all areas of military instruction, are giving serious attention to the development of highly precise, long-range weapons as well as to systems to track and control them which are functionally combined with reconnaissance and target acquistion systems into target acquistion and weapons delivery systems. By 1974, the foreign press had revealed the first information on the development in the

U.S. of onboard missile equipment for receiving information from the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System for the purpose of determining movement parameters for correcting their trajectories. They intend to put this kind of equipment in tactical missiles as well. In the opinion of foreign specialists, NAVSTAR will make it possible to obtain high precision for control equipment on the different types of cruise missiles. Navigation will be accomplished by comparing the given target coordinates with the current missile coordinates. Although the solution of navigation problems onboard modern guided weapons is possible using information obtained from existing navigation systems ("Omega", "Loran", "Tacan" and so forth), the use of NAVSTAR is considered preferable due to its world-wide capability, jamming resistance and precision, its ability to work with onboard inertial missile guidance system and its relatively high survivability. Only such a navigation satellite system, it is suggested in the West, can provide flying cruise missiles with terrain relief tracking. Along with the compression of terrain maps, NAVSTAR allows the missile guidance problem to be solved with the help of a relatively simple onboard computer.

The receiving equipment for missiles has already been tested on an F-4 airplane guided from a military transport aircraft. A single-channel enciphered receiver has been developed for installation on board cruise missiles. The equipment, based on this, provides for guidance with an error of 5.2 meters. In the opinion of foreign specialists this precision is fully sufficient for weapons guidance.

Since NAVSTAR is a radio navigation system with its inherent deficiencies, its effective use in complicated high-jamming environments is being given great attention and the system characteristics which allow the evaluation of its jamming protection are being studied. It has been noted, in particular, that the "satellite-to-ground" radio channel, a sufficiently wideband signal (20.46 MHz) is being used which is produced on two independent frequencies. Therefore, the information reception is only possible with a correlating receiver which restores the code. In this case the jamming source, it is thought, must be sufficiently powerful to suppress the signals on both frequencies. In addition, the spatial selection of useful signals is provided by a highly directive antenna. The passive receipt of navigation signals makes it possible to strictly program the operation of onboard equipment. Special measures are also taken for increasing the jamming resistance of its own receivers. Primarily, this is a reduction in the bandpass (of 0.01 Hz) of the tracking tuned circuit. The problem of integrating the onboard missile inertial guidance system with the radio navigation system and their interoperation occupies a special place. Under intense jamming, information from the inertial guidance system is used to verify tracking from the satellite navigation signals. In this case a narrow bandpass for the tracking tuned circuit provides for elimination of a large part of the spectrum, and consequently, the jamming energy.

Thus, according to announcements by foreign specialists, the integrated use of the onboard missile inertial guidance system and the NAVSTAR system equipment provide for acceptable characteristics for prospective systems of highly precise missile weapons.

By increasing the power of its nuclear missile weapons, increasing their precision and reducing their vunerability, Pentagon strategists count on being able to use them without retaliation.

The Soviet Union is a decisive opponent in the struggle against any type of arms race, including space. But it is absolutely clear that counting on the possibility of using a path to military superiority through space is built on illusions.

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CSO: 5200/1358

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

WEST EUROPEAN UNION ON COORDINATED RESPONSE TO SDI

PM191255 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 15 Nov 85 p 14

[Report by Vinceno Nigro: "West European Union [WEU] Ministers Meet in Rome; European Consultations on Space Shield: 'Too Early to Form Joint Decision'"]

[Excerpt] Rome -- "Star wars"? Too early, thanks. Europe is not yet ready to give an answer to the U.S. offer of cooperation in SDI. But its decision is not due to any weakness of the body (the WEU) responsible for coordinating the old continent's defense policy.

The fact is that it is too early to say anything about "star wars", especially on the eve of a Reagan-Gorvachev summit which will be largely devoted precisely to SDI. Second, there is the impossibility of even a vaguely "joint" stance on the part of the WEU's seven member countries. Between France and Britain there is a gulf which no political mediation and no appeal to Europeanism seems capable of bridging.

Nevertheless, the WEU decided to discuss "star wars" yesterday. As guests of Andreotti and Spadolini, the foreign and defense ministers of Britain, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Belgium met in the assembly hall of the lower house. Confirmation of the fact that no accord was even sought came from Andreotti's talk, which closed the seven delegations' work for the day. The foreign minister's speech, inevitably vague and generic, merely hinted at the existence of a document prepared by a "special working group" and approved by the seven countries.

The working group's task was to verify the chances of a coordinated response to the U.S. offer. Let us look at the elements on which agreement was reached:

First, the fact that everything the Americans do in this sector is to be done in accordance with the ABM treaty guidelines. Moreover, observance of the ABM treaty must be bound to its absolutely "strict" interpretation (as against the elasticity displayed by the United States). The WEU ministers also agree that nuclear deterrent is the only effective way to avert war: "Its global credibility must be maintained, with due account given to the effect of technological developments and to the evolution of the military threat."

Among other noteworthy points, the doucment stresses the need to safeguard "the Atlantic alliance's strategic unity, avoiding any division between the defense of the United States and of its European allies." Speaking at a press conference, Andreotti made a brief reference to this issue, but the WEU's warning is clear. It is impossible to plan a space shield that will protect the United States alone, and it is impossible to offer something of this kind to the USSR without protecting Europe too.

Theoretical aspects of SDI were not broached at the meeting, but according to the ministers there are four main aims to be borne in mind from political-industrial viewpoint. 1. First, to ensure that European companies interested in participating in the U.S. project enjoy the same rights as U.S. companies, taking account of the limitations of existing international accords. 2. Next, it will be essential to define measures (patents, and so forth) necessary to protect the rights of European industries that have participated in any of the SDI research projects. 3. It will be necessary to ensure that European participation in research projects will open the way to a real exchange of technology. 4. Whatever happens, a "brain drain" to the United States must be prevented.

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CSO: 5200/2550

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

HANOVER CONFERENCE RESULTS ON EUREKA ANALYZED BY IZVESTIYA

PM121520 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Nov 85 Morning Edition p 7

[Own correspondent Ye. Bovkun dispatch: "Multifaceted 'Eureka'"]

[Text] Hanover -- For 2 days (5 and 6 November) in Hanover, the ministers of foreign affairs and scientific research of 18 West European countries and common market representatives discussed the principles, goals, and main avenues for cooperation within the framework of the "Eureka" project put forward by France as a civilian alternative to the U.S. "star wars" program.

The first conference of potential participants in "Eureka" was held this July. Then the partners could only formulate their common goal to create an "all-European technological community" through which West Europe could not only withstand the mighty technological onslaught of the United States and Japan, but create its own range of research projects focusing main efforts on the development of the latest technology in spheres of modern science such as computers, robots, biotechnology, lasers, ecology, and so forth.

The participants in the Hanover meeting were faced with deciding on the content of the "European technological community" formula in order to ensure that it did not remain an empty turn of phrase, but it seems that doing this is not easy. Some 300 different plans were presented for discussion.

The discussion took place behind closed doors, and although delegation members tried to be optimistic at briefings, there were obviously substantial differences of opinion. As a result only 10 plans were approved in all, envisaging among other things the creation of powerful industrial lasers capable of competing with their U.S. and Japanese counterparts, the production of microcomputers, and the organization of a European network of research centers. The remaining proposals were rejected.

Certain representatives of small countries expressed concern, fearing that multinational monopolies and large concerns from states with stronger economies would gain a gradual stranglehold on the "European technological community," using it primarily to strengthen and expland their influence. The grounds for those fears were confirmed by West German press commentaries devoted to the Hanover conference. They stressed that "Eureka" must be a "European brainchild" of entrepreneurs, not states.

So why, in that case, did small West European countries generally agree to participate in the project. Greek Foreign Minister T. Pangalos replied: "It is hard to arrive at an honest compromise between large and small European nations. And that is why we chose the lesser of the two evils. It is better to be dependent on Europe than on America."

At the same time, "Eureka" is linked with more serious alarm. Journalist circles in the FRG are talking openly about the possibility of the project being militarized and turned into an appendage of the U.S. "star wars" program.

The meeting declaration stresses that the "Eureka" research will accord exclusively with "civilian tasks." But few have any illusions on that score. At least it is well-known that many firms which are actively participating in the production of military output are striving to get involved in "Eureka."

It is no surprise that the FRG public has a guarded attitude to the multifaceted "Eureka." Technological progress is a necessary thing, but only if it really serves peace.

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CSO: 5200/1153

SWEDEN PLANS EUREKA PROJECTS, COMMENTS ON HANOVER MEETING

Government Wants to Participate

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Nov 85 p 11

[Article by Mats Holmberg]

[Excerpts] Sober-Minded Atmosphere

Last Tuesday, eighteen ministers gathered in Hanover's giant industrial exhibition center in a markedly sober-minded atmosphere. The trumpet blasts from Paris had become somewhat subdued. As the outlines of the future Eureka had become more distinct, if at all, they gathered around a clearly leaner project than originally perceived.

"For the present, the government of Sweden does not plan to appropriate any special funds for Eureka projects," Minister Ingvar Carlsson told his colleagues, and, on this particular point, a certain measure of European unanimity prevailed.

No joint post will be set up for Eureka. Each country will decide for itself how to finance joint projects, which, in the case of most countries, involve no new state funds at all.

Secretariat Shrunk

The enormous Eureka secretariat which formed part of the original French plans will become considerably reduced—if at all set up.

"Eureka will not be allowed to create any new international bureacracy," said Ingvar Carlsson in his speech last Tuesday, and similar viewpoints were advanced by several other European countries.

According to the communique that was issued last Wednesday, the governments of Europe will function as some kind of intermediaries for the enterprises of

their countries. They will keep abreast of the research that is carried on in other countries and will provide the various enterprises with information. They will pave the way for cooperation, for example, on the basis of joint standards.

"Would the enterprises or already existing bodies not have been able to manage this without Eureka?"

Risk Involved in Being Left Outside

"The question is justified," says Under Secretary Kerstin Niblaeus in the Cabinet Office. "But we have asked the industrial enterprises whether they want for the government of Sweden to become involved. I believe that we would have become subjected to much criticism from the industrial sector if we had chosen not to become involved."

"For Sweden as a non-EC country, Eureka is interesting," says Kerstin Niblaeus, "in that it provides the opportunity for talks and exchanges of information where we would otherwise normally be left outside."

"Eureka already exists as an idea," she says. "We are not the ones who have developed that idea. But it would be difficult to choose to jump off a train which is already on its way."

Two Projects Suggested

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 7 Nov 85 p 8

[Article by Mats Holmberg]

[Excerpts] How does one reduce and render harmless environmental poisons in the atmosphere over Europe? How are European researchers to talk to one another in a joint computer language via already existing telecommunications networks?

In connection with these two questions, Sweden will participate in research within the framework of the European technological project EUREKA.

Opening Up Doors

What does EUREKA have to offer a country such as Sweden?

"The very fact that EUREKA exists as a concept may open up doors for Swedish enterprises," Ulf Dinkelspiel of the Swedish delegation stated. "We may, for example, within the EC carry on talks on a more equal footing than was previously possible."

In about thirty instances, Swedish enterprises already conduct far advanced talks on joint research with partners in Europe. With reference to the obligation to preserve industrial secrecy, the Swedish delegation declined to reveal their names at Hannover, and other Nordic delegations complained of Sweden's secretiveness and "noticeably low profile."

"I prefer calling it pragmatism," Ulf Dinkelspiel said. "We have not found it worth while to distribute lists of projects that we should like to have. We want to give the enterprises free hands—if some of them would need the support of the government, we shall be prepared to offer it to them."

Pragmatism

Sweden will, for example, arrange regular meetings of researchers where enterprises may look into possibilities of cooperation without any obligations on their part.

Is Eureka really the key to "the rebirth of European technology," as claimed by its most fervent advocates in the past?

Not even when the eighteen ministers parted last Wednesday had that question been fully answered. France, which 7 months ago developed the idea, talked about Eureka in optimistic and poetic terms, Sweden and Great Britain with restrained skepticism.

Relieved

Still, a certain amount of relief was discernible that the feelings which, at some point in the past, had generated the concept of Eureka are so widely embraced.

Europe, the eighteen ministers agreed, would have to cooperate in order not to lag behind American and Japanese technological advances.

Whether this cooperation will improve or change because it is called Eureka seemed less important.

Editorial Views Meeting

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Nov 85 p 2

[Editorial: "EUREKA--One Step Further"]

[Text] Sweden is still interested in the idea of Eureka. Concretely, we participate in two out of ten projects of cooperation that have been agreed upon within the framework of Eureka. As far as Sweden is concerned, this is the result of Eureka's second conference of ministers, held at Hannover during the past week.

In a state of wait and see but positive--this is, in short, the position in general of the eighteen countries participating in Eureka, although there are

differences of degree. That is actually a wise position. The endeavors on the part of Western Europe not to lag entirely behind, first and foremost, the United States and Japan in the technological race need joint involvement of this kind.

The Hannover meeting developed the Eureka project a couple of steps further compared to the initial conference in July in Paris: the forms of cooperation were laid down in somewhat greater detail, the question of a single secretariat will be solved prior to the next meeting of ministers (in London in May) and ten cooperation projects have been given the Eureka stamp. Last but not least, several countries, including West Germany and Great Britain, have followed the example of France and taken a positive position on public research grants for Eureka projects.

This, however, has not ensured the future of the Eureka project. Whatever Mitterrand may have had in mind when he launched the idea of Eureka, Eureka is no organization of the type of Euratom, the future of which may be evaluated at a certain point of time. Eureka is a way for West European industries and research institutes to get to know one another and to cooperate. Several projects which will be given the stamp of Eureka would have come about without Eureka, but many which may now be arranged might never have materialized for the simple reason that enterprises and research centers would not have got into contact with one another.

To Sweden, the role of Eureka as a coordinating body and information center is important. When it comes to projects in which we want to become involved, Sweden will have to choose a la carte like the rest. This freedom of choice is, naturally, of particular importance for a country that is free of alliances. For even if Eureka will be operating exclusively in the civilian area, it is, for example, in many cases practically impossible to distinguish between civilian and military usefulness of certain forms of basic research.

7262

CSO: 3698/126

SWEDISH FIRMS ASEA, VOLVO, ERICSSON INTERESTED IN EUREKA

Stockholm NY TEKNIK in Swedish 25 Jul 85 p 2

[Article by Hans Henrik Ronnow]

[Text] Per Gyllenhammar wants to join the European technological cooperation Eureka:

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"Biotechnology, new materials, aircraft and space technology should be con-The state of the s ceivable areas for Volvo."

Last week, Western Europe decided how to organize Eurkea, its new high technology research cooperation. Representatives of 17 nations found it best to encourage enterprises to organize their cooperation. Several Swedish enterprises are interested.

Prime Minister Mitterrand of France has for the past 3 months been endeavoring to unite Western Europe in a large-scale--though vague--research project. Unless the Europeans unite, American technology will take hold of the European market through Reagan's concentration on a research project, SDI, the Star Wars Program.

Last week, foreign and research ministers of 17 European countries, including Sweden, attempted in Paris to decide on the set-up of Eureka.

One-Day Meeting

At the meeting, which lasted one day, it was decided not to decide upon any special set-up. Nor was any position taken on the questions how much Eureka was to cost and who were to pay.

The meeting agreed that Eureka will not be a permanent organization with an overall research objective but rather a number of research initiatives and invitations for cooperation.

The ministers felt that the whole thing could function by, for example, two or more enterprises in some countries proposing technical cooperation to one another. Each state which is a member of Eureka may, subsequently, evaluate on a case-to-case basis which project will be supported with funds or in some other way.

Sweden Positive

The Swedish representatives at the Paris meeting, Vice Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson and Under Secretary Carl Johan Åberg, found that such a cooperation suited Sweden extremely well. Prior to the meeting of ministers, the Swedish government had given a number of Swedish enterprises what little information was available on Eureka.

Through the Federation of Swedish Industries, they had also made inquiries as to which enterprises wanted to participate in a cooperation.

Before the vacation of Swedish industrial enterprises at least five enterprises had responded. ASEA, Atlas Copco, L M Ericsson, Saab Scania and Volvo all gave expression to a generally positive interest. Saab Scania felt that they would be able to contribute expertise in areas such as supercomputers.

Volvo's Pehr Gyllenhammar says that Eureka was merely a rough idea but, at any rate, ventured to give a few examples of areas of activities suitable for Volvo:

"New materials, biotechnology, aircraft and space technology."

Not Military

From official Swedish quarters it was pointed out at the Paris meeting that the cooperation should not be military.

In modern research, it may, however, be difficult distinguishing between civilian and military technology. But Carl Johan Åberg found that it should not cause any difficulties in evaluating research projects:

"They must not have military objectives, nor be financed by military authorities."

Nor did a representative of a French military technology enterprise find this problem too difficult. Pierre Agrin of Thomson pointed out that military and civilian labels for research were a question of "ways in which to present research projects."

7262 CSO: **3698/113** USSR'S SPACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE DIRECTOR INTERVIEWED ON TOKYO TV

OW181449 Tokyo NHK Television Network in Japanese 1200 GMT 18 Nov 85

[Interview with Ronald Zinnurovich Sagdeyev, director of the USSR Space Research Institute, by NHK correspondent Hirano in Geneva--date not given--recorded in Russian, with Japanese subtitles; Sagdeyev remarks translated from Russian]

[Text] [Hirano] Will the Soviet Union agree to a compromise on the Strategic Defense Initiative issue?

[Sagdeyev] I think that first of all, it is necessary to preserve the ABM agreement. And I think -- in my view -- it is not possible to reach a compromise in the interpretation of this agreement. If the agreement continues to be considered, as some SDI supporters believe to allegedly allow not only research but also testing, including testing in space and at proving grounds, I think that in this case, a compromise is hardly possible.

[Hirano] Yes, If the U.S. does not give up space weapons research, precisely which measures do you have in mind on the part of the Soviet Union?

[Sagdeyev] We have conducted an analysis and have come to the conclusion that there is a whole set of countermeasures of most different types. Well, I can enumerate them for you. There are ways to improve offensive weapons for the purpose of making them less vulnerable with regard to anti-missile defense measures, like for instance increasing the number of false targets which in English are called decoys. All these are methods, I would say, of passive defense, passive countermeasures. There are also active methods. Active methods, I think, already make use of other features. Space platforms, hypothetical space platforms on which it is intended to deploy anti-missile weapons, will be extremely vulnerable. It will be extremely expensive and maybe simply impossible to place stations into orbit as they would have to be sufficiently well defended themselves. Finally, there are methods linked with a required arithmetical increase in the number of strike weapon units.

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GHANA STATES OPPOSITION TO STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC in English 30 Oct 85 pp 1, 6 and programmed and programmed

[Article by Eugene Forson]

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[Text]

GHANA has expressed its opposition to U.S. President Ronald Reagan's

'Star Wars' Programme, describing its security value as illusory.
Ghana's delegate to the U.N. General Assembly's first committee (Political and Security), Mr Kwesi Simpson, said Ghana was opposed to the extension of the arms race to outer space which "should be preserved exclusively for peaceful purpo-

ses".
Mr Simpson, a Minister Counsellor at the Ghana Permanent Mission to the U.N.. was contributing to the committee's general debate on disarmament.

He expressed Ghana's concern at the possibility that a 'Star Wars' Programme could have a destabilising effect on existing arms limitation agreements such as

the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty (ABM).

Mr Simpson noted that the ultimate security the 'Star Wars' Programme was supposed to ensure "will remain an illusion as ever before."

He suggested three steps towards complete disarmament: A nuclear weapons freeze, a pleage by nuclear weapon states against a first stroke policy and negotiations for allround cuts in existing levels of nuclear armaments.

Mr Simpson, however; noted that these measures. even if agreed upon by all concerned, "would be in vain under present circumstances"

Without an effective comprehensive test ban treaty, such a treaty totally prohibiting nuclear weapons test explosions was "more than ever before urgent" he added.

/13104 CSO: 5200/1

BRIEFS

MOSCOW CITES U.S. MAGAZINE—According to a report in the U.S. magazine AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, one of the giants of the U.S. aerspace industry, Lockheed, will set about creating and testing a new type of space weapon in the near future which will be a key element in President Reagan's notorious Strategic Defense Initiative. It concerns a missile, fired from ground launchers, designed to destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles beyond the atmosphere. [Text] [Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 19 Nov 85] /8309

MOSCOW TV CITES U.S. SENATORS—The opponents of arms limitation in the United States have made their usual attempt to hinder the achievement of fruitful results at the Soviet—U.S. summit meeting. On the eve of President Reagan's departure for Geneva, a group of right—wing senators sent him a letter containing an appeal to reject the possibility of any kind of compromise on the "star wars" program. The senators declared that offensive space weapons are too important for there to be an agreement on the limitation of their development and production. [Text] [Moscow Television Service in Russian 1545 GMT 18 Nov 85] /8309

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

FRENCH LE MONDE ON U.S., USSR SUMMIT PREPARATIONS

PMO71357 Paris LE MONDE in French 6 Nov 85 p 1

[Editorial: "Symbols"]

[Excerpts] "It's all just for show": Propagandists in Washington and Moscow are trying to outdo each other's imaginative efforts to secure the best possible "position" for their respective leaders 2 weeks before the Reagan-Gorbachev summit. Monday was an exceptional day in this connection, the palm going unquestionably to the Kremlin strategists.

Judge for yourself: IZVESTIYA publishes an interview granted last week by Reagan to four Soviet journalists, accompanied, however, with "operating instructions" and refutations as long as the presidential statements themselves.

Does Mr Reagan introduce anything new into the debate through the interview? One may have thought so for a moment since he seemed to be making a pledge not to deploy a defense system in space before the elimination of both superpowers' nuclear weapons. The White House, aware of the ambiguity of the President's remarks, quickly set matters straight. The elimination of nuclear weapons is an "ultimate objective," it announced, but it is not a "condition" for the possible future deployment of a strategic shield in space.

So the U.S. stance remains basically unchanged: There will be no deployment without prior negotiation proposals, but deployment will not necessarily be bound to the outcome of these negotiations. The existing proposal that the secrets of space war technology might someday be shared with the USSR is also reiterated, but judging from the accompanying Soviet commentaries, the least that can be said is that it is at present encountering disbelief.

However, for the time being Mr Reagan has succeeded in remedying the situation and redressing the balance of forces before the Geneva meeting: While the Soviet side wanted to devote the summit essentially to "star wars," it is now clear that it is U.S.-Soviet relations as a whole that will be under review.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

GENEVA YIELDS ONLY AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE DIALOGUE

PY211804 Sao Paulo Radio Bandeirantes in Portuguese 1450 GMT 21 Nov 85

[Text] -- The summit conference on nuclear weapons has ended. Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev have broken their silence but said nothing. Nevertheless, we will discuss Genevea with Newton Carlos, political analyst for the Bandeirantes press staff. [Begin recording] Good afternoon. At the end of the Geneva summit conference there are two things to be taken into consideration:

First, the common document, the document jointly signed by the United States and the USSR. This document is more a goodwill statement than anything else. It promises to accelerate the disarmament negotiations; to reduce cold-war tension; not to allow the proliferation of atomic weapons; to end chemical weapons; to promote all types of exchanges — scientifical, technological, etc.; and to continue the dialogue. The United States and the USSR will continue their dialogue.

Second, Mikhail Gorbachev's press conference. In this press conference, we learned that there had been many divergences during the 2-day talks. We must go from words to action, from intentions to facts, warned Gorbachev.

There was no agreement on the conference's main issue: Reagan's "star wars" project — the construction of a space shield. In a short speech, Reagan said that Americans and Soviets are treading a good path, but, according to Gorbachev, Reagan continued to insist that his space shield is a defensive system, not an offensive weapon. Gorbachev reacted by saying that it is an offensive space weapon that can be used against rockets, satellites, etc, and that this weapon has not been accepted by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet leader was tough in his press conference. He promised an adequate response [Carlos changes thought], called for an adequate response if the United States insists on continuing research and development for the space shield project. [words indistinct]

The Geneva summit conference may seem like a success in diplomatic language, in the diplomatic language of its final document, but it has been no success in obtaining concrete results. Nevertheless, no matter how insignificant it may seem, at least the dialogue will continue, and this is very important.

From Geneva reported Newton Carlos. [end recording]

/8309

USSR'S SEMEYKO REFUTES ALLEGED ARMS VIOLATIONS

LD082341 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 8 Nov 85

[From the "Glance at the British Scene" program; commentary by station observer Lev Semeyko]

[Text] Now that the Soviet-American summit is not so far away, what we witness is an obvious polarization of forces.

There are those who favor a radical change in international affairs for the better, and those who oppose it. The latter may become indignant and say: You are wrong — we are for these changes; who wouldn't like the Geneva meeting to be a success? But in reality they are against any success. They are pouring oil on the flame meant to burn down the confidence in the Soviet Union's policy of those who still retain it. Despite years and years of anti-Soviet propaganda. They have found a new bugbear, a claim that the Soviet Union is allegedly violating its international commitments. Caspar Weinberger seems to be taking the lead in the exploitation of this claim. During the recent NATO meeting he unleashed a whole series of accusations against the Soviet Union. This fact did not pass unnoticed in Moscow when forecasts were being made of the likely results of the Geneva summit.

Some of the mass media have snatched up the Pentagon's cue. The DAILY EXPRESS, for instance, urges the public to be on the lookout. Why? Just to give a hostile reception to the Soviet calls for making realistic and radical steps to prevent the arms race in outer space and to stop it on earth for one thing, and, for another, to see to it that all watchful Britons approve without much thought any display of toughness by the American side. They are, so to say, to be vigilant.

The Soviet Union is accused of violating the provisions of the SALT-II and the 1972 ABM treaties. It should be noted at this point, without going into great details, that the claims about the Soviet Union's alleged violations of the provisions of the SALT-II treaty are absolutely wrong. The Soviet Union keeps standing by its provisions, though the treaty has not been ratified through Washington's fault. Accusations that the Soviet Union is allegedly testing two new types of missiles are not worth a penny. The SS-25 missile is a modified version of the SS-30 missile, and not an entirely new missile. American officials know this just as well as they know that the radar station now under construction near the city of Krasnoyarsk is not an ABM facility. It is a facility for tracking satellites and is not meant to knock out American warheads in outer space with a higher degree of accuracy. The Soviet Union honors scrupulously both the ABM and the SALT-II treaties. By contrast, in defiance of Article Six of the ABM Treaty, the construction is now in progress of the Pave-Paws radar stations in Greenland and in Britain.

The same DAILY EXPRESS claims wrongly that the Soviet Union allegedly violated on several occasions the convention banning bacteriological warfare and the 1925 Geneva protocol banning the use of chemical weapons. The claim was already laid to the Soviet Union earlier, but there has been no proof whatsoever of these violations. The evidence of this are not only statements made by the Soviet side but also the findings of several international commissions sent to work in Indochina. It would have been more proper for the DAILY EXPRESS to tell its readers that the people and environment in Indochina still suffer from the after effects of the use by the United States of defoliants and herbicides. The same applies to 60,000 American veterans of the aggressive war in Vietnam who demand money-compensation and free medical aid from the administration.

The call of the vigilant DAILY EXPRESS not to forget that all that Moscow has in mind is the alleged victory of the Soviet communist system is especially primitive. After all, this call is fully in line with the American President's statement in London about the Soviet Union being the focus of evil. Both claim that all that the Soviet Union thinks about is to make the Soviet communist system dominate the world with the help of arms. This is as far removed from the truth as the sun is from the earth. The Soviet Union does not want to build a communist society on ashes. It is confident that peaceful competition will show which system is better and has a future. It's this competition that Moscow is calling for, being certain that communism will triumph by virtue of the laws of social development and not by virtue of military competition or particularly military confrontation.

To compete peacefully and prevent a devastating nuclear catastrophe the world needs treaties and agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. It needs first and foremost agreements on curbing the arms race. The nearest future will show whether these agreements will be possible in present day conditions.

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FINNISH PAPER ASSESSES GORBACHEV STRATEGIC ARMS PROPOSAL

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 5 Oct 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Initiative to Gorbachev"]

[Text] The new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has taken the reins firmly in hand in his own country. But also in great power politics he has in a short time changed the position of the Soviet Union from a slow passive respondent and loser of diplomatic points to a quick moving and flexible initiator. Gorbachev has confounded the United States with his bold new proposals in the area of arms limitation.

This results on the one hand from a new flexibility in regard to the subject matter itself and on the other hand just as much from skillful diplomacy. Hardly a better time and place than Paris could have been chosen for the presentation of the Soviet Union's new European policy outline.

France as the owner of its own nuclear weapons and medium range missiles and the rebel of the Western league is the most fertile ground for Gorbachev's new proposal, in which he gives up the idea of tying Euro-weapons to the connections between the great powers. This is realism which has been made into a virtue. Besides, it strokes French self-esteem.

In great power politics the link with Euro-weapons was one of the most difficult features to control during the Geneva talks. Relinquising the link smooths the road considerably toward an agreement about intercontinental missiles and space weapons.


Gorbachev also made public the Soviet proposal according to which intercontinental missiles would be reduced by 50 percent. This is a clear concession on the Soviet side, when it is known that the Soviet Union has a clear lead precisely in this area.

His formulation concerning the conceptualization of space weapons is also interesting. He said that the Soviet Union had proposed the prohibition of offensive space weapons. Whether this formulation means that defensive space weapons would be allowed is not clear. At least the stand is considerably more flexible than that in which the Soviet Union demands a prohibition against all research concerning space weapons.

This proposal also shows the admission of the reality of the long-standing existence of space weapons and the making of realistic suggestions.

The first comments by the Americans now show the initiative to be firmly with Gorbachev. He has reached this position by responding at length to the many questions emphasized by the Americans, in which case the direct rejection of his proposal is very difficult.

Interest in the Geneva summit conference is clearly growing after Gorbachev's visit to France. On the one hand, perhaps for the first time we have realistic possibilities for some kind of arms control agreement. And on the other hand, Gorbachev's skillful diplomacy puts the great communicator Reagan to a real test.



The proposal to reduce the intercontinental missiles by 50 percent is a clear concession from the Soviet's part; the country is known to have a clear head-start exactly in this area.

12989/12948 CSO: 5200/2533

SALT/START ISSUES

FINNISH PAPER: USSR PERHAPS ALLOWING NUCLEAR ARMS INSPECTION

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 Oct 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Less Secret"]

[Text] During the next few weeks the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will visit two nuclear power plants in the Soviet Union. The inspection opens a new page in the history of Soviet nuclear energy; it is the first visit by non-aligned inspectors to the country's plants.

The visit will occur before the month-long nuclear ban agreement follow-up meeting at Geneva beginning on the last Tuesday of August and which is feared to be stormy. The three negotiators at the meeting, the Soviet Union, the United States and England, promised the nuclear free nations that they are striving for arms reduction and will share their nuclear energy knowledge and technology intended for peaceful purposes with other countries.

The United States and England opened a portion of their nuclear power plants to the IAEA inspectors already during the last decade although the agreement did not require this of them as nuclear arms countries. The inspections were only sporadic. The inspection of the Soviet nuclear power plants will undoubtedly also remain a formality, but just the same it will mitigate the sharpness of accusations at Geneva.

The readiness to openness by the Soviet Union improves the commercial outlook for the country's nuclear power technology, which up to now had been shaded by a veil of secrecy that discouraged customers. What is more important, however, is that the Soviet Union has given up its ideology of complete isolation. The opening of the civilian sector for inspection logically leads to the approval of the principle of inspection also in the military sector. This will not be reached soon, but the basic situation has already changed. The earlier foundation principle has now become goods to be negotiated.

These kinds of changes toward openness best increase genuine security.

12989/12948 CSO: 5200/2533 SALT/START ISSUES

BRIEFS

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION SESSION ENDS--Geneva, 5 Nov (TASS)--The latest session has ended here today of the Soviet-U.S. permanent consultative commission, which was set up to assist the implementation of the goals and propositions of the Treaty on Limiting Antiballistic Missile Systems and the temporary agreement on a number of measures in the sphere of strategic offensive arms limitation, which were concluded between the USSR and United States on 26 May 1972, and of the agreement on measures to reduce the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war, which was concluded between the two countries on 30 September 1971. [Text] [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1413 GMT 5 Nov 85] /8309

235

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

DUTCH BUSINESSMAN ON CRUISE ISSUE, USSR CONTACTS

PM201039 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT (HET VERVOLG supplement) in Dutch 2 Nov 85 p 3

[Interview with Amsterdam businessman Ernst van Eeghen by Maurits Schmidt: "I Am a Self-Appointed Defender of the 1 June Decision"]

[Text] Ernst H. van Eeghen, a man of standing, would not say whether [Inter Church Peace Council secretary] Mient Jan Faber was his Tom Poes [reference unknown]. Asked whether his talks with the Soviet authorities were preceded by promptings from Faber he replied laughing: "I do not know. You will have to ask Mient Jan about that. But our contacts are excellent. I think that Faber is a courageous man. That man has to get involved in a lot of things, has his principles and is reasonable. It is very easy to talk about conventional arms with him."

Van Eeghen is no pacifist, he declared. He has been too much of a soldier for that. "I believe in sensible defenses. For years I have been advocating a strengthening of conventional defenses and I still do. I am opposed to cruise missiles for purely military reasons."

Van Eeghen is a businessman from an old Amsterdam family and has never done business with the Russians and was therefore wrongly invited to the opening of the World Trade Center in Amsterdam as a representative of trade with the Soviet Union. The fact that this week he had, in his own words, a hand in the invitation to Prime Minister Lubbers to hold talks with Russian President Ryzhkov [title as published] about Russian reductions in the numbers of SS-20 missiles is, in the final analysis, more or less an accident. "In the war I was shot in an artery in my leg. The blood then had to find its way through other arteries. Similarly in contacts with the Soviet Union I am one of the smaller channels now that the diplomatic roads are blocked. Force majeur."

As he has done with other newspapers Van Eeghan asked us expressly to read over the draft interview through the eyes of Prime Minister Lubbers and Russian Ambassador Blatov: "Neither of them should be upset by anything. Too much is at stake."

But if we had left out every remark "which you must not write down" we would not have been left with much more than an official statement. The same applied to Van Eeghen's other request, made out of concern for public health: no photographs with a cigar. It was impossible. During the interview we did not know that Lubbers had told parliament about Ryzhkov's invitation. This invitation being, however, on condition that the deployment decision be postponed. Van Eeghen said nothing about it. The first question—posed with typically Dutch suspiciousness—which has also been put by people from the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, was: Who is this businessman who has so much access to the highest Soviet circles?

Van Eeghen, laughing pleasantly: "I have been hearing that question for so long. But as long ago as March Zamyatin (head of the international information department of the Central Committee) told me that the Russians wanted to talk, and this has now been confirmed in the telegram. But then no one believed it, and I could not prove it. Now the proof is there. Of course it has been preceded by detailed talks. This month I have been to Moscow three times."

[Schmidt] But if there were contacts in March, and probably earlier, how is it that the Russians waited until the last day with their telegram?

[Van Eeghen] There are a number of reasons. In the first place what [word indistinct] discussed with the experts did not percolate through to the top Soviet leaders. Second, there is the irritation in the Soviet Union that we, as a small nation, should concern ourselves with defense in the Far East. That was very clear to me. Nor did they understand why we were doing this.

You know that it was because of the anxiety that the SS-20's are easy to move. But this is completely untrue. It is possible to move them, but it takes months. A Russian told me: You haven't got your colonies any more, you no longer have any interest in what we are doing on our Eastern borders.

So you have to explain how the 1 June decision grew historically. I have simply made the decision clear and understandable. I was a self-appointed defender of the Netherlands decision.

[Schmidt] Have you been in contact with the Dutch Government?

[Van Eeghen] I only told the government about the most recent mission. I then felt that I was very close. And when I came back on Wednesday I was there again.

[Schmidt] The Russians find you a representative figure with whom to speak?

[Van Eeghen] They take me for what I am worth. We looked at all the implications; that was a very complicated talk. Late on Tuesday evening I was told that the Soviet Union could accept the l June decision as such, with some modifications that were not terribly important. These chiefly dealt with the timing of the whole thing, such as the reduction of the SS-20's in phases. But the details are so insignificant that they would not get in the way of an agreement, if the Netherlands really wants one—something I had to assume.

[Schmidt] What precisely will these reductions be?

[Van Eeghen] That is complicated. The Russians do not tell you how many they have deployed, the Americans cannot do more than simply guess, because no one can look in the garage. Then you need a lever in the talks, and then there is the question of medium-range missiles where somewhat to the Russians' surprise the SS-4's have been left out. Although they have around 130 of them. Then in the Netherlands the mistake was made that the Americans' figure that there are 441 launchers was translated into 441 SS-20's. Whereas these launchers are the trucks on which the SS-25 and SS-16 are also transported.

But anyway, you have to take something as your point of departure. Ask the Russians: Make a reduction of 63 SS-20's to 378—that is 27 megatons against the 9.6 megatons of our 48 cruise missiles, almost three times as much—and then it is not easy for the Soviet General Staff. Nevertheless, the Russians told me later on Tuesday evening that they are prepared to accept the Dutch 1 June decision as a working paper at future talks with Mr Lubbers. Arbatov said of this: "This is a historic decision by the Soviet Union. We have never done this before." An advantage for the Russians here is of course that they completely avoid verification—the checks on the things that are deployed there, by using the U.S. figures as a base.

But what this now means—and this is something much more important—is that this is not simply a bilateral development with the Netherlands—for which the Netherlands itself opened up the way with the 1 June decision—but also a signpost for an agreement in Geneva. They could bring those 63 SS—20's in there. If they reach agreement there hundreds of SS—20's will have to disappear and they could include the 63 among these. Arbatov and the Russian leadership are hoping that this will be an opportunity to negotiate flexibly. And they are willing to do this now.

[Schmidt] But you have already noted that Lubbers seems unwilling to follow this path, seems to be tied hand and foot to the United States and to NATO, and simply to be heading toward deployment.

[Van Eeghen] I do not know whether that is true. No, I do not want to tread on anyone's toes. In the present phase you have to be free to make a decision. I am counting on a good decision.

[Schmidt] Have you any advice at the present moment, when there is still no decision?

[Van Eeghen] I do not know. The biggest chance seems to be that Lubbers can no longer do anything under the terms of the 1 November decision; but where he could find a way out is: You could take a decision in favor of deployment, but you do not need to carry it out. The date for the agreement with the Americans—first 1 January and now 1 December—if he could postpone this, then there are again a large number of possibilities. And if in the meanwhile he has met Ryzhkov....

[Schmidt] You think the meeting will go ahead? You know how things have been when Van den Broek has been in Moscow.

[Van Eeghen] The invitation is there: Lubbers is in a very difficult position in his cabinet.... But I would prefer not to go into that. In your commentary you can write what you like, but you will have to leave me out. It is only guesswork, but I have the idea that he will approve the deployment decision and will then wait with the agreement with the United States. Then the November decision will be a castrated ape. Or if you say I said this, better call it a harmless agreement. If he does not do this he will find himself in the middle of a cabinet crisis.

Actually it is important that during my talks in Moscow, for that is what you are really driving at, I heard no anti-U.S. propaganda at all. A new wind really is blowing there. It is also important that the top leaders made this decision themselves and that Arbatov played a very major role here.

[Schmidt] I can imagine that people will say: The Russians are trying to make trouble in a happy NATO marriage, or in a good alliance with the United States.

[Van Eeghen] Nonsense. The Russians are simply accepting the Netherlands June 1984 decision. The Russians have not taken a single initiative. Some people say: You are allowing yourself to be used by the Russians. I say "no!" The only thing that you can say is: You are allowing yourself to be used by the Dutch Government. How could the Russians use me to accept a proposal from the Dutch Government? That is impossible! That is completely impossible. People are so easily frightened. You get everything thrown at you in situations like this.

It is an accident that I know the Russians. But things are often predestined in your life. But when I was out for a walk this morning to get a breath of fresh air there was a woman who said to me: Mr Van Eeghen I have just lit a candle for you in church.

There was also something nice which happened in Moscow this week. I had a car with a driver—I always do when I am there—and I had to stay in my hotel by the telephone the whole day. This driver was standing there in the cold in a snowstorm waiting for me. I had to treat this man properly and when he was driving me to the airport I thanked him and made my excuses. Then he said to me, "Sir, I know that there is a very strong peace movement in your country and that you have something to do with it. For that reason I would stand in the cold all day again." Nice, wasn't it? Typically Russian. I could not see an Amsterdam taxi driver saying that.

[Schmidt] Are you a pacifist?

[Van Eeghen] No, not at all. But do you want to know what I have against cruise missiles? I am against them. For purely military reasons. Just look, in 1979 the U.S. President asked the advice of the Committee of Joint Chiefs of Staff on the deployment of medium-range weapons in Europe. The highest military

body comprising the navy, army, air force and marine commanders. Their advice was unanimous: Don't do it. These weapons are only to be used to deliver the first strike. That is something you can do: As the Netherlands you could, with 48 cruise missiles, drop 500 times the Hiroshima bomb on Russia. The only thing that you could be sure of is that half an hour later you would no longer exist. And if the Russians start. For the Netherlands they would need a maximum of 15 SS-20's. We would then be more backward than the Batavians. We would have lost the game.

[Schmidt] Thus the military-industrial lobby won.

[Van Eeghan] It was simply as a result of the wretchedness of the politicians that that whole thing came about. The pressure from Schmidt who wanted to become independent of the Americans. I asked a high-ranking NATO officer: What is your opinion now of the Dutch problem? He said: "You are completely out of your gourd. For one very simple reason: you will no longer be able to laugh from your grave. The English will be able to. If they are flattened they will still be able to laugh because they know that their Polarises and Tridents will still be able to flatten Russia. And why is this important? Because it gives the English a say at Geneva. The Russians know that. You cannot do that. After the bomb you will not even be able to fire a water pistol. Thus you do not belong to this club. If you do not have your own nuclear weapons, you cannot get involved," this man said to me.

Like the Norwegians and the Danes, and rightly so. This man said, "Thank God on your knees that you do not have to take them." And I said, "Why do you bring these things up here? Before all you talked about was the money it cost. Our loyalty to the alliance? But that is nonsense! In 1979 every country was given a free choice about getting involved. The Norwegians and the Danes decided against. And I will tell you: We definitely have a worse name in Washington than the Norwegians. The Americans say of us, 'They are prevaricators.' I have never heard any criticism of Norway. And in the Netherlands the only result is a divided nation, a large amount of anti-Americanism, and the whole thing is not worth it. We simply wanted to go along with the big boys; something we always want to do. With not the faintest idea of what this would mean for the Netherlands."

[Schmidt] Could a different government coalition after May 1986 have some positive influence on matters?

[Van Eeghen] I am no politician, no clairvoyant. It will be very difficult to back out of an agreement. We are a people who remain true to the law. And you are also forgetting NATO, because we really do need it. For I do take the view that the Soviet Union's overwhelming conventional combat forces must be reduced, for they hang over Western Europe like a cloud. Well-disposed Russians also realize this, I can tell you.

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NEWSPAPERS REACT TO REAGAN'S UN SPEECH PROPOSALS

Inaugurates 'New Diplomacy"

PY262025 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 25 Oct 85 p 3

[From the "Notes and Information" page: "Ronald Reagan Seizes Initiative"]

[Text] To the extent possible after a first reading of the speech Ronald Reagan delivered at the United Nations in commemoration of the 40th anniversary of this international institution, we will attempt to make some reflections on this address, whose historical importance is undeniable, inasmuch as it reveals the spirit that will guide the performance of the U.S. President at the summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev.

After making an assessment of the spirit, merits, and shortcomings of the United Nations, Reagan tackled the main topic of his speech: the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, "whose differences are profound and permanent," and the comprehensive and quite ambitious proposals that he will present on behalf of his country to his Soviet counterpart, not only to promote disarmament but also to lay the solid foundations of a lasting peace between the two major powers. The speaker assured his international audience: "We continue to believe that a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be started..." This conclusion will lead him to discuss in Geneva "radical, equitable, and verifiable reduction of the large arsenal of offensive nuclear weapons." He added that it is possible to discover unquestionable merits in Gorbachev's counterproposals, which may help the interlocutors to begin a genuine process based on the principle of mutual concessions.

Reagan's style was calm but quite firm because he let it be understood that it is his conviction and that of the U.S. people that wars are begun by regimes which, on one hand repress the freedom of their people and citizens, and on the other hand consider force to be a means to spread their ideology. He consequently reported the following facts: the presence of 118,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, fighting against the Afghan people; the presence of 146,000 Vietnamese soldiers, backed by the Kremlin in Cambodia, fighting a war of occupation; the presence of 1,700 Soviet advisers in Ethiopia, involved in military planning and directing the operations of 2,500 Cuban expeditionary soldiers; the presence of 1,200 Soviet military advisers in Angola, directing the military operations of 35,000 Cuban troops; and the presence of 8,000 Cubans in Nicaragua along with elements from the Soviet bloc, including nearly 3,500 policemen and secret service agents.

These regional problems and the disarmament negotiations demand a solution to guarantee that the spirit of peace can prevail between the two superpowers. This, according to Reagan, should be the "central question" in the Geneva negotiations. He then added, certainly to the surprise and jubilation of the Soviets: "Peace based on the partition [of the world] cannot be an authentic peace. Let us speak plainly: Nothing can justify the permanent division of the European continent. Walls of partition and mistrust should be replaced by better means of communication in the interest of an open world. Before I go to Geneva, I intend to make new and broader proposals in this regard."

Everything indicates that in this inaugural phase of a new and bold diplomacy, the initiative has been seized by Reagan, who defended his Strategic Defense Initiative plans with new and attractive arguments. The U.S. President explained that the space shield will above all serve to make the old strategy of nuclear deterrence obsolete and superfluous. He noted that the old strategy only serves to accelerate the super arms race (an escalation which, like the constant technological advance that is behind it, cannot be halted), which horrifies the citizens of the world. The so-called "Star Wars" program is not intended to destroy lives, but to destroy missiles carrying lethal warheads. President Reagan asked: "Who will be threatened if Western and Soviet research -- both equally successful -- should develop nonnuclear systems that do not destroy human beings but ballistic missiles?" He then went on to suggest that the U.S.-Soviet competition be directed at this objective: "If our peoples are destined to compete militarily in order to preserve peace, let us then compete in the construction of systems to protect our societies, not of arms systems that can destroy both societies and a large part of God's creation at the same time."

Reagan ended by citing former Premier Kosygin who made almost identical statements 18 years ago. Indeed, the U.S. President, seizing the initiative, has made a suggestive appeal to the imagination of everyone who loves peace.

'Global Approach' Lauded

PY261306 Rio de Janeiro LATIN AMERICA DAILY POST in English 26 Oct 85 p 4

[Editorial: "Reagan's Address"]

[Text] President Reagan's address to the 40th General Assembly of the United Nations was a serious attempt to put the problems of the world in perspective. We liked his global approach to the gamut of differences which are outstanding between the United States and the USSR.

By going beyond single-issue problems and trying to tap the root causes — which lie in the basic antagonisms between the Soviet bloc and Western political systems — the U.S. president is being realistic. Whether his grand scheme of coming to accommodation with the East bloc on basic issues ever will be realized is not certain, but as an old Hebrew saying has it, "It is not encumbent upon thee to complete the work but neither art thou free to desist from it altogether."

It is readily apparent to students of modern history that many of the world's local political difficulties have been exacerbated by the East-West post-World War II antagonisms. It is, therefore, "incumbent" on both Washington and Moscow to try to diminish the endemic mistrust and, by so doing, remove some of the underpinnings of the conflicts around the globe in such places as Afghanistan, Central America, and the Middle East.

While so doing, the two superpowers could also make headway on the nuclear arms question, which is not a bilateral problem but a concern for everybody everywhere on Earth.

The American President's address to the UN deserves close study and a serious response on the part of the Kremlin. It could serve as a basis for reordering the processes of helping resolve the troublesome political problems around the world.

'Clever Answer' to Soviet Proposal

PY290535 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 26 Oct 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Reagan's Answer"]

[Text] The speech U.S. President Ronald Reagan delivered last Thursday at the United Nations proposing that at the November meeting in Geneva with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev priority be given to the discussion of regional conflicts (not to negotiations on the possible reduction of nuclear weapons by the two superpowers) represents a clever answer to the recent offensive by his Soviet rival. A comment was expected from Reagan on Gorbachev's proposal to promote, in exchange for the interruption of the "star wars" program, a 50-percent reduction in long-range offensive nuclear weapons and a freeze on the number of intermediate range missiles the two powers have deployed in Europe. But President Reagan surprised everyone. He counterattacked by minimizing the discussions on disarmament and defending the search for solutions to the conflicts in Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan, and Cambodia.

This is obviously another chapter in the long propaganda battle between the United States and the Soviet Union -- illustrated by speeches like Reagan's the day before yesterday -- and in the struggle for the hegemonic expansion of the two superpowers.

Reagan specifically called the Soviets' violent interference in several countries, but for obvious reasons said nothing about the U.S. invasion of Grenada and the direct U.S. support for governments such as that of El Salvador. Expansionism and unbridled use of force to solve conflicts in one's "backyard" are not exclusive to either of the two superpowers. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have constantly proven this, even from the tactically important position of reaffirming their military power, thereby to reinforce in the world public's mind the idea of a necessarily partitioned world.

Perhaps what is most worrisome in the Reagan counteroffensive is the confirmation that on the U.S. side also, the Geneva summit is only seen as a great opportunity for the two superpowers to engage, on a privileged stage, in another battle in the propaganda war, where the ability to misrepresent and propose nothing to halt the unbridled arms race — which can reach a new worrisome level if the "star wars" program is not abandoned — overshadows the need for negotiations on nuclear weapons, which is the only road that may lead to lasting peace.

There is no doubt that the regional conflicts Reagan recalled should be discussed with due respect to the people's right to self-determination, a concept that is alien to the logic of the superpowers. It is unacceptable that the search for solutions contemplating the right to self-determination should be skillfully denied and that at the same time those conflicts should be used as propaganda material, as a smoke screen to prevent a dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States. Geneva should be more than a mere occasion for the joint appearance of the made-up images of two leaders who are as billigerent as they are intransigent. If concrete solutions to halt the arms race are not agreed on, not only could confidence in future summits be buried but also the possibility of controlling the atomic arsenals. It would just be a road leading more rapidly to war.

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EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

BRIEFS

USSR CDE DELEGATE ON NON-USE OF FORCE--Stockholm, Nov 11 (TASS)--Most of the participants in the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe come out for the confirmation and concretization of the principle of non-use of force as an indefeasible norm of conduct of states. Ambassador at Large Oleg Grinevskiy, head of the Soviet delegation stressed in his speech that an agreement on this key problem would become an important measure of confidence aimed at the revival of detente and radical improvement of the international political climate. The proposal of the socialist countries concerning a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force serves exactly this purpose. Contrary to the mood prevailing among the delegates, who seek to start concrete work, representatives of the U.S.A. and some of its allies are trying to hold up the businesslike discussion of that problem and hamper the productive work at the conference. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1320 GMT 11 Nov 85] /8309

FINNISH PRIME MINISTER BACKS NUCLEAR FREE ZONES

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 19 Oct 85 p 13

[Article: "Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa: Nuclear-Free-Zones Are the Gateway to Peace"]

[Text] "If the nuclear arms reduction does not advance on the international level, the achievement of regional solutions is all the more important, Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa asserted at the Science and Trade Ethics for Peace seminar which began in Helsinki on Friday.

"The reduction of nuclear arms and other weapons could be started by regional agreements and demilitarization, as, for example, by the founding of nuclear-free-zones." These are the messages Sorsa brought from the Socialist International Arms Reduction Conference in Vienna, in which he took part this week.

"During recent weeks, encouraging results in this spirit have included the agreement for a Pacific area nuclear free zone. This is one way, at this phase perhaps more proclamatory, but still significant as a gesture."

"What would it look like on the European stage if there were a nuclear-free-zone from the North through Central Europe to the Balkans, according to corresponding initiatives already made. The idea recieved a lot of support at the conference," Sorsa continued.

Sorsa told how the Arms Reduction Conference's emphasized that the super powers must now be pressured to create the political will and the achievement of a favorable turn of events.

"After a fatefully long period, gnawed by suspicions, the great powers should not let the opportunity slip through their fingers, but they should act to bring about a change as soon as possible," said Sorsa.

The organizers of the Tradesmen's and Scientists' Peace Movement seminar are 14 professional peace organizations.

12989/12948 CSO: 5200/2533

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

DUBLIN COMMITTEE OF UNIONISTS URGES NORDIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 21 Oct 85 p 14

[Article: "Dublin Committee of the Union Movement Hurries Nordic Nuclear-Free-Zone"]

[Text] The international union movement's peace and arms reduction organ, the so-called Dublin committee, suggested Sunday at its 2-day conference held in Helsinki that the governments of the Nordic countries should take practical steps soon to bring about a Nordic nuclear-free-zone.

According to the committee, the meeting of Nordic parliamentarians concerning the nuclear-free-zone, to be held in Copenhagen in November, is a clear indication of the wide support the zone plan enjoys in all Nordic countries.

In its public statement the committee also gives its support to the Central European nuclear-free passageway and to the creation of a nuclear-free-zone in the Mediterranean area. According to it, the goal should be the creation of nuclear-free Europe.

The meeting was attended by union representatives from all Nordic countries, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, plus by the representatives of international organizations.

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END